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Abstract 
 
 
The rise of China and the implications thereof has created much furore in literature, be it 
academia or popular media. Western concerns are significantly different to those of African 
states and, typically, discourse focuses on Western concerns and interests in Africa. Chinese 
support of African states has been referred to as a ‘new scramble for Africa’ or a form of 
‘neo-colonialism’; whereas China invokes the principle of sovereignty in dealing with these 
states. Chinese motives are numerous, from access to resources to shoring up political 
support – not significantly from that of Western objectives; this research report will seek to 
understand China’s motives and Western reactions thereto. Upon reaching such an 
understanding, an evolution of Singapore’s foreign policy will be introduced and her 
successful engagement with China will be referenced. A possible solution will be inferred 
from Singapore to the African case study, that of Angola, as well as any weaknesses to such 
an inference.  
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Introduction 
 
 
Title 
 
Instruments of power: China’s use of soft power in Africa. 
 
Aim 
 
The primary aim of this research report is to understand the impact of China’s use of soft 
power and the implications for African states. By means of understanding China’s methods 
and goals, this paper will then seek to propose an appropriate response that would leave the 
continent less exposed to yet more exploitation, and rather benefit from the Sino-African 
relationship. 
 
Rationale 
 
Views of Chinese expansion into Africa range from those who welcome them as liberators 
from traditional Western oppression to those who believe that Chinese involvement is merely 
another form of neo-colonialism, and many ambivalent appreciations in between these two. 
What one can be sure of, however, is that China, like all states, is interested in advancing her 
own standing in the world – Africa merely provides her stepping stone in this regard. Africa 
offers many opportunities for a state that is willing to fund spurious governments, and China 
possesses the financial wherewithal and has a history of dubious dealings with less than 
legitimate regimes; that China has a history with many African states that fought for liberation 
is also noted. Soft power has been the modus operandi for the Chinese dispensation in recent 
years, and has been effectively applied in her backyard; states such as Singapore and Malaysia 
have experienced as much for a longer period than African states and therefore afford one the 
opportunity to understand the methods of Chinese engagement and the effects thereof. 
Singapore, despite its relative weakness when compared to China, has displayed a remarkably 
pragmatic means of engagement. By understanding how Singapore reacted to Chinese 
influence and by analysing where Angola relatively, an appropriate response will be 
proposed. 
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Theoretical framework 
 
The concept of power may be analysed in many different ways, namely as a goal, as a 
measure, as reflecting victory or the attainment of security, or as control over resources and 
capabilities – these are all realist based paradigms. The power used in this analysis was 
proposed by Joseph Nye, namely that of soft power. He describes soft power as an attractive 
power that “occurs when one country gets other countries to want what it wants”.1 Whilst soft 
power has been the recipient of criticism most notably by historian Niall Ferguson, who stated 
that the “trouble with soft power is that it’s, well soft”,2 Ferguson goes on to cite soft power 
uses by the British empire in the nineteenth century in terms of the spread of its culture, 
thereby merely disputing the efficacy of soft power (mostly American), but not the existence 
thereof. This is not universal, however. Whilst being a fundamentally realist paradigm and 
even touted by liberal schools of thought in its soft version, power is still in need of a 
definitive clarification, in soft or hard forms; the mutable nature of power makes it very 
difficult to pin down. Hard power is conventionally quantified, inter alia, by measuring GDP, 
military expenditure, and product output of a state. Soft power rather, lends it self to a 
qualitative analysis, and is perhaps more efficient in explaining the changing nature that is 
power. The “weakness” that soft power is far too elastic to be measured, is also disputed - 
Nye noting that this criticism fails to understand the power resources and behaviour of soft 
power, and that one can “measure and compare the cultural, communications, and diplomatic 
resources that might produce soft power for a country.3 
 
Methodology 
 
This research report will make use of a qualitative analysis of the issue at hand. Whilst soft 
power is not immune to a quantitative analysis, a deeper theoretical understanding of China’s 
engagement by means of soft power is sought, an analysis far more conducive to a qualitative 
method. Case studies of the states from Africa and Asia will be carried out to assess the 
effects and their respective responses to Chinese soft power. 
 
                                                 
1 Nye, J.S. “Soft Power”. Foreign Policy, No. 80 (Autumn 1980), p. 166 
2 Ferguson, N. “What is Power?”. Retrieved 21 April 2009 from 
http://www.hoover.org/publications/digest/3058266.html    
3 Nye, J.S. “Think Again: Soft Power”. Retrieved 17 April 2009 from 
http://www.foreignpolicy.com/story/cms.php?story_id=3393  
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Chapter outline 
 
Chapter One: The Nature of Power 
 
The theoretical underpinnings will be dealt with here, power will be defined and the concept 
of soft power will be introduced and dissected. 
 
Chapter Two: Chinese Instruments of Power 
 
China’s development and use of soft power will be analysed in this chapter. The effects of 
China’s economic position on her soft power status will be considered, and will also be 
compared and contrasted to their hard power standing. 
 
Chapter Three: Singapore in Review 
 
Chinese soft power interactions vis-à-vis Singapore will be investigated, and especially how 
such a small state responds to and utilises soft power.  
 
Chapter Four: Angola’s Precarious Position 
 
The African case study of Angola will be referred to here, her current standing in terms of 
Chinese soft power, as well as her regional and continental standing, and ambitions. 
 
Chapter Five: A Suitable Response 
 
Once having understood the nature of Chinese soft power as applied in her region and 
Angola, a response will be developed here. The aforementioned issues in terms of 
generalisability will be and the Singapore method of response will be contextualised in terms 
of Angola, thereby developing a suitable response. 
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Chapter One 
 
The Nature of Power 
 
 
Traditionally power has been the preserve of the realist theorist; this school of thought’s 
influence has waxed and waned, particularly rising to the fore during the Cold War and then 
seeing a decline in the initial post-Cold War era. Post 9/11 saw a Bush doctrine take a 
decidedly Hobbesian leaning and a concomitant dwindling in liberal policy. This chapter will 
introduce the traditional concept of power and evolution thereof, and then introduce Joseph 
Nye’s “soft power”. 
 
Power defined 
 
The definition of power is not one which can be considered in a vacuum, it needs to be 
understood in terms of competing theories and temporally. Its primary proponent, namely 
realism narrowly describes power as the ability for one to get what one wants either the threat 
or use of force4. Amongst the first realist writings, albeit not a strictly international relations 
theory text, was E. H. Carr’s The Twenty Years’ Crisis (1939) which delivered a scathing 
attack on contemporary liberal thought that had characterised the 1920s under Woodrow 
Wilson. Post-World War Two saw Hans Morgenthau produced Politics Among Nations, 
setting the tone for international relations theory for the Cold War period to come5. The 
concept of power then came to be predicated upon the centrality of the state – that sole entity, 
according to Max Weber, for whom a monopoly of the legitimate use of force exists6. The 
notion of statehood is underpinned by four essential criteria as defined by the 1933 
Montevideo Convention on the Rights and Duties of States, namely: a permanent population, 
defined territory, government, and foreign relations7. Whilst not being absolute, these criteria 
do provide one with a yardstick. Exceptions have included, inter alia, the TBVC8 states 
created under the apartheid regime in South Africa as well as the Palestinian Authority, the 
former an attempt to quell international outrage and the latter who, for a significant period, 
                                                 
4 Dunne, T. & Schmidt, C. “Realism” in The Globalization of World Politics, (2nd Ed.) Baylis, J & Smith, S 
(Eds), Oxford University Press, New York, 2001, p. 144 
5 Burchill, S. “Liberalism” in Theories in International Relations, (2nd Ed.) Palgrave, London, 2001, p. 70 
6 Dunne, T. & Schmidt, C. Op Cit, p. 150 
7 Carolan, C.J. “Republic of Taiwan”. New York University Law Review, Vol. 75, No. 429, p. 450 
8 Transkei, Bophuthatswana, Venda and Ciskei 
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were not territorially based9. By whichever means a state comes about or is recognised, it is 
crucial that it possesses power; this power is not only the ability to influence others, but also 
to manipulate outcomes. 
 
Liberal theory proposes that the raison-d’être of the state is to maintain the basic rules of the 
game in a pluralist arena and that there are no explicit or consistent national international 
interests10. Liberals maintain that the “endogenous determines the exogenous”, that intra-state 
political arrangements impact on relations between all nation-states. Further, liberals insist 
that state power is being eroded by processes such as globalisation and the rising power of 
transnational organisations such as the UN and WTO11. Due to the nature of interdependence, 
liberals believe that states’ constraints are determined only by the level of interaction and this 
contributes to an incremental, constant change when actors become involved in new 
relationships12. Essentially, liberalism pays the least attention to the “threat” the international 
system presents, viewing it rather as an arena for interaction. Liberalism has come to 
appreciate the concept of power as defined by one of the founders of neoliberalism, Joseph S. 
Nye, who noted that power comes in many guises and that soft power, so often derided by 
realists, is essential to the understanding of international relations. Understanding the origins 
of soft power, however, requires an understanding of the realist perception of power and of 
the state. 
 
Realism insists that the state is a unitary actor on the world stage, limited only by the 
anarchical nature of the international system. Sovereignty is of the utmost importance, and 
authority to govern matters within her own borders are at the sole discretion of the state13. 
Morgenthau notes in his second principle of realism that international politics is defined in 
terms of power, thereby facilitating an understanding between “politics and the facts to be 
understood”; further he insists that power is what “sets politics as an autonomous sphere of 
action and understanding apart from other spheres, such as economics, ethics, aesthetics, or 
religion” 14. The traditional realist notion of setting power above all else is crucial as realists 
insists that it primarily informs state decisions, versus the liberal view of contextualising the 
                                                 
9 Mingst, K.A. Essentials of International Relations, (4th Ed) W.W. Norton & Company, New York, 2008, p. 
100 
10 Ibid, p. 104 
11 Burchill, S. Op Cit, p. 63 
12 Mingst, K.A. Op Cit, p.97 
13 Ibid, p. 104 
14 Morgenthau, H.J. Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power, (7th Ed.) McGraw-Hill, 2006, p. 5 
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state within the greater international polity. This does not however, exclude the influence of 
economics and the like; Morgenthau stresses that the ‘national interest’ is always defined in 
terms of strategic and economic capability15. The concept of mutability under realism also 
needs to be addressed. Realism, under Morgenthau, posits that political realism is not only 
theoretical but also normative16, resulting in the rational nature that is realism. Even though 
realist dogma strictly advances the principle of autonomy, it also accepts the exogenous 
political realities and the influences they exert on foreign policy, affording realism a 
pragmatic element. This pragmatism allows one to not only clearly define power and its 
sources, but also reasons why states pursue power. 
 
Mearsheimer notes five bedrock assumptions why states pursue power and seek hegemony 
in the international system. Alone, none of these assumptions mould a state’s behaviour, 
collectively, however, they predict a world wherein states have reason to think and 
(sometimes) act aggressively17. The first of the assumptions is the perennial realist reference 
to anarchy. Anarchy does not denote absence of order or the existence chaos, rather it depicts 
a world characterised by security competition and war, but anarchy is not a sine qua non for 
war either. By itself, it is an ordering principle positing that states have no higher authority 
thereby underscoring the principle of sovereignty18. Offensive military capacity is 
Mearsheimer’s second assumption; he proposes that all states inherently possess this capacity 
and, therefore, the wherewithal to hurt and possibly destroy each other. Parity does not exist 
in this offensive world and, accordingly, some states present a greater threat than others. 
Thirdly, we find uncertainty as to other state’s intentions, especially in light of the above 
mentioned offensive military capability. These intentions may be said to be benign, but may 
change quickly, implying that one “can never be sure that other states do not have offensive 
intentions to go along with their offensive capabilities”19. Survival is the primary goal by a 
state, the fourth assumption by Mearsheimer. Herein territorial integrity and autonomy of 
domestic political order are paramount, sans which a state is unlikely to be able to pursue its 
primary aims; Mearsheimer quotes Stalin, saying “[w]e can and must build socialism in the 
[Soviet Union]. But in order to do so we first of all have to exist”20. Finally, states are 
assumed to be rational actors, that they are aware of their external environment and strategise 
                                                 
15 Burchill, S. Op Cit, p. 79 
16 Morgenthau, H.J. Op Cit, p. 9 
17 Mearsheimer, J.J. The Tragedy of Great Power Politics, Norton, 2001, p. 29 
18 Ibid, p. 30 
19 Ibid, p. 31 
20 Loc Cit 
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how to survive in it. Of significance is the awareness that states have of their actions on the 
behaviour on other states and how other states’ behaviour is likely to affect their own strategy. 
 
This awareness of other states’ possible intentions leads one to a fundamental tenet of realist 
understanding of power, that of relative power. As noted by Krasner: “Sovereign states are 
rational self-seeking actors resolutely if not exclusively concerned with relative gains because 
they must function in a anarchical environment…”21. This facilitates the “pursuit of power” as 
defined by realists, for whom power is the “currency of great power politics”22. Pursuing 
power in this anarchical environment is informed by a Hobbesian state of nature – even if 
momentarily free from the predations of other states, the shadow of the future looms dark and 
informs power seeking behaviour. That states act differently towards friends than enemies is 
indicative of this “relative pursuit of power” competition, anarchy does not explain who and 
who is not a friend, however23. This crucially informs the pursuit of power because, as noted 
in Mearsheimer’s third assumption, one can never be sure as to the intentions of any other 
state. Projecting into the long term is difficult as state power may vary significantly, and it is 
therefore difficult to estimate how much power is actually necessary, hence the pursuit of 
hegemony now – Mearsheimer maintaining that this is the only assured method of ensuring 
security24. This pursuit of relative power is what leads to a “security dilemma, where a state’s 
increase in security inevitably leads to the decrease of all other states’ security. 
 
Power may be defined in many terms and is certainly not immutable. Traditionally power 
was defined by natural sources, namely geography, natural resources, and population25. These 
merely describe power potential – it is the exploitation of these sources that traditionally saw 
the rise of powers. Upon examining these traditional measures of power, Niall Ferguson 
found that while population may be correlated with power, he highlights that by this measure 
India ought to be the second most powerful state in the world26. In a similar vein he notes that 
military power is also not as great an advantage as is was once deemed, citing the rapidly 
narrowing technology gap; here he actually notes that the military advantage that the US 
                                                 
21 Krasner, S. “Realism, Imperialism, and Democracy”. Political Theory, Vol. 20, No. 1, p. 39 
22 Mearsheimer, J.J. Op Cit, p. 12 
23 Wendt, A. “Anarchy is what States Make of it: The Social Construction of Power Politics”. International 
Organization, Vol. 46, No. 2, p. 397 
24 Mearsheimer, J.J. Op Cit, p. 35 
25 Mingst, K.A. Op Cit, p. 109 
26 Ferguson, N. “What is Power?” Retrieved 29 April 2009 from 
http://www.hoover.org/publications/digest/3058266.html   
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maintains actually occurs at a significant cost as a result of a diminishing law of returns 
because of the narrowing of the technology gap27. This demonstrates how what appears to be 
a major power advantage may come at a cost that negates this advantage. Morgenthau’s third 
principle of political realism emphasises that power is “an objective category that is 
universally valid, but it does not endow that concept with a meaning that is fixed once and for 
all”28. Further, he notes that both historical and political contexts are important and that power 
“may compromise anything that establishes and maintains control over man”29, and hence 
power covers a wide range of social means, from physical violence to the most subtle 
psychological ties. 
 
Soft power 
 
Nye’s conceptualisation of soft power came about at the end of the Cold War, a dynamic 
period that saw the end of multipolarity and heralded Francis Fukuyama’s “End of History”. 
While introducing soft power in his founding article in 1990, Nye refers to the traditional 
definition of power, namely the “ability to do things and control others, to get others to do 
what they otherwise would not”30. He goes on to cite the Soviet demise, European disunity, 
Japanese military weakness and Chinese lack of development as deficiencies in challenging 
the United States, and that barring any significant changes, the US would remain the military, 
economic, scientific, cultural, and ideological superpower for the foreseeable future31. 
Continued US hegemony, Nye suggested, was not dependent on merely maintaining these 
power advantages, but rather on another source of power, namely the ability to change the 
behaviour of states by means of attraction or co-opting other states – by means of soft power, 
defined by Nye as “getting others to want the outcomes that you want – co-opt people rather 
than coerce them” without the use of inducements (“carrots”) or threats (“sticks”)32. This, he 
proposes, will lead to other states admiring the dominant soft power state, emulating its 
example and wishing to attain its level of prosperity. 
 
Nye may have coined the term “soft power” in 1990, but this was merely putting a name to a 
form of power that has long been part of a state’s diplomatic tool box. Ferguson refers to the 
                                                 
27 Loc Cit 
28 Morgenthau, H.J. Op Cit, p. 11 
29 Loc Cit 
30 Nye, J.S. “Soft power”. Foreign Policy, No. 80, (1990) p. 154 
31 Ibid, p. 155 
32 Nye, J.S. Soft power, Public Affairs, New York, 2004, p. 5 
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United States’ hegemonic predecessor, the United Kingdom, in tracing soft power’s lineage, 
noting that Britain actually pioneered the use of soft power by means of missionaries’ 
sermons and the dissemination of British culture, including sports such as cricket and soccer, 
as well as spreading English tea33. 
 
In discussing soft power, Nye distinguishes between soft power and influence – influence, 
he insists, may also rest on the hard power of threats or payments, whilst also noting that soft 
power is more than just persuasion or the ability to motivate people by means of argument. 
Simply put, he notes, “soft power resources are the assets that produce […] attraction”34 that 
leads to acquiescence. In comparing hard and soft power, one may compare the variety of 
ways one can obtain the desired outcomes. Hard power requires economic inducements or 
threats of force, or the restriction of one’s preferences. Soft power’s means of attraction, 
appealing to shared values and purposes, without any explicit threat or exchange taking place, 
is observable but intangible – much as our marketplace decisions are guided by Adam Smith’s 
“invisible hand”. That both hard and soft power aim to achieve similar goals, that is to say 
affecting the behaviour of others, means the distinction between them is also one of degree, in 
terms of nature and in the tangibility of the resources; Nye proposes that power is measured 
along a continuum rather than as a binary, each point associated with a likely resource35: 
 
 Hard Soft 
Spectrum of behaviours          coercion      inducement 
Command←*------------*----- 
agenda setting    attraction 
--------*-----------------*→Co-opt 
Most likely resources                   force            
payments 
                  sanctions     bribes 
institutions               values 
                                 culture 
                                 policies 
 
The correlation between soft and hard power is undeniable. A state’s who’s hard power is on 
the wane is certainly likely to see a concomitant decrease in soft power; this is because its 
hard power resources endow it with the ability to shape the international agenda to some 
extent and hence some of its attractiveness – Nye notes that even both Stalin’s and Hitler’s 
                                                 
33 Ferguson, N. Op Cit 
34 Nye, J.S. (2004) Op Cit, p. 6 
35 Ibid, p. 7 
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hardened regimes sought to establish myths of invincibility so as to attract other states36. 
Correlation does not necessarily imply causation as soft power, whilst complemented by hard 
power, is not dependent on hard power – as demonstrated by the soft power wielded by the 
Vatican that elicited the response from Stalin: “How many divisions does the Pope have”37. 
The Soviet Union’s soft power actually declined after they invaded Hungary and 
Czechoslovakia even though their economic and military resources increased; the same can be 
noted with the US post 9/11, much of the sympathy that was afforded the US was lost when 
the US flexed her hard power muscles upon invading Iraq. The reciprocal also applies; states 
who punch above their hard power weight include, inter alia, Norway, Canada, and South 
Africa. Institutions facilitate soft power as well; the dominant state is likely to form an 
institution that represents its ideals, thereby advancing its agenda38. The ability to shape 
international rules that are congruent with one’s state will increase said states legitimacy on 
the international stage and possibly even increase the states attractiveness. 
 
Soft power, as with hard power, relies on sources. As felt by the US post Iraq war, it has 
become more costly to use traditional methods of power for a multitude of reasons, namely: 
economic interdependence, transnational actors, nationalism in weak states, “the spread of 
technology, and changing political issues”39. Today states have three sources of soft power: 
culture (only where it is appealing to others), political values (when seen to be employing 
them at home and abroad) and foreign policy (only when it is legitimate)40. Soft power, unlike 
hard power, is not only the preserve of the state; NGOs, industry and others beyond the 
control of the state may also attract (or repel) other states. Nye notes fundamentalist Christian 
groups and Hollywood images that might be offensive to Islamic nations that achieve the 
latter41. These sources of power also need to be effectively exploited and developed, 
something the US is not doing as demonstrated by then Secretary of Defense Donald 
Rumsfeld professing to not even understand soft power42. This is further represented by the 
funding allotted to the United States Information Agency (USIA) which dropped ten percent 
in the ten year period after the end of the Cold War43 - this saw Washington sponsored 
                                                 
36 Ibid, p. 9 
37 Loc Cit 
38 Ibid, p. 10 
39 Nye, J.S. (1990) p. 160 
40 Nye, J.S. (2004) p. 11 
41 Op Cit, p. 15 
42 Nye J.S. “The Decline of America’s Soft Power”(1990b). Foreign Affairs, Vol. 83, No. 3, p. 16 
43 Ibid, p. 17 
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broadcasts reach 70-80% of Eastern Europe and approximately half of the Soviet Union; on 
the eve of 9/11 only 2% of Arabs listened to Voice of America. Nye is stressing a link 
between the importance ascribed to soft power by the US dispensation and their attraction in 
predominantly Islamic states – he believes that soft power has usurped hard power in 
international relations. Ferguson, however, poignantly notes the soft power is “well, soft”, that 
in spite of America’s soft power in the form of Coke, Big Macs and Hollywood, the majority 
of the Muslim world still does not love America; he cites the aforementioned deterioration of 
the British empire example as proof of the limited efficacy of soft power44. 
 
Soft power is limited, possibly even more so than hard power, due to it relatively nebulous 
nature that does not easily lend itself to quantification. Traditionally, when observing power 
cycles of dominant states or when, with slightly more hubris, trying to predict the wane of the 
current power, military and economic statistics have been taken into account. This is feasible, 
considering the nature of international politics hitherto. Nye compiled a table representing 
dominant states from the 1500s on, producing Table 145. The abovementioned power sources 
are readily quantified, whereas soft power, as per Nye, needs to be assessed in focus groups, 
opinion polls, and in other far more subjective measurement environments. Upon re-
examining Charles F. Doran’s Power Cycle Theory¸ Dylan Kissane too highlighted the 
quantifiable quandary that soft power presented46. He does, however go on to highlight the 
observable effects of soft power in terms of the EU. Kissane cites Parag Khanna’s labelling of 
the EU as the “metrosexual superpower”, and how it has facilitated the EU’s rise to a 
powerful international position47. Significantly, Nye observes that “Eastern Europeans and 
Turks gave the EU higher marks than the United States for playing a positive role on a variety 
of issues – ranging from fighting terrorism to reducing poverty to protecting the 
environment”48. 
 
 
 
                                                 
44 Ferguson, N. Op Cit 
45 Nye, J.S. (1990b) Op Cit, p. 183 
46 Kissane, D. “Curves, Conflicts, and Critical Points: Rethinking Power Cycle Theory for the Twenty First 
Century”, p. 49, retrieved 6 July 2008 from 
http://works.bepress.com/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1007&context=dylankissane 
47 Ibid, p. 76 
48 Nye, J.S. (2004b) “Europe’s Soft Power”. The Globalist, 3 May 2004, retrieved 25 November 2009 from 
http://www.theglobalist.com/StoryId.aspx?StoryId=3886  
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Table 1: 
Leading States and Major Power Resources, 1500s-1900s 
Period  Leading 
State 
 Major Resources  
Sixteenth 
Century 
 
Seventeenth 
Century 
 
Eighteenth 
Century 
 
Nineteenth 
Century 
 
Twentieth 
Century 
 Spain 
 
 
Netherlands 
 
 
France 
 
 
Britain 
 
 
United States 
 Gold bullion, colonial trade, mercenary 
armies 
 
Trade, capital markets, navy 
 
 
Population, rural industry, army 
 
 
Industry, political cohesion, navy,  
liberal norms 
 
Economic scale, scientific and 
technical  
leadership, military forces and 
alliances, 
liberal international regimes 
  
 
The limits of soft power are also highlighted by Nye. These limits, however, assume the 
existence of soft power, unlike the sceptical views mentioned above. Rather Nye notes when 
soft power will and will not lead to the desired outcomes. A disparity in terms of culture is 
likely to lead to a decrease in attractiveness49, that questions the validity of Niall Ferguson’s 
criticism that “Coke, Big Macs, CDs by Britney Spears, and DVDs starring Tom Cruise”50 
does not make the Islamic world love America anymore; here the US would have to develop 
more contextually appropriate soft power tools. A regime whose power is more widely 
dispersed is more likely to respond than a more authoritarian regime – that is to say soft 
power is more likely to be recognised in democracies. Finally, soft power’s effects are more 
                                                 
49 Nye, J.S. (2004a) Op Cit, p. 15 
50 Ferguson, N. Op Cit 
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likely to be more diffuse and therefore impact on the general goals that a country seeks, rather 
than achieve specific goals that hard power is more likely to achieve. That soft power is 
generally beyond the control of the state is another limit according to the critics, highlighting 
examples such as the anti-war movements in Vietnam and 2003 Iraq wars51. For Nye this is 
not a limitation of soft power, rather he believes that this is more reason for governments to 
ensure that their own actions and policies are congruent with their soft power. 
 
Nye explicitly states that soft power occurs by means of attraction only, that neither sticks 
nor carrots classify as soft power, and that soft and hard power are on the opposite ends of the 
continuum. Further, he highlights that hard power may facilitate soft power. From these two 
statements, one may infer that the reciprocal may also be true, that soft power may facilitate 
hard power. This might be ably demonstrated in Africa today where the attractiveness of 
China may ease their entry into African markets; China’s model of development is the best 
example of this, seeing as China has displayed remarkable growth in the post-Mao era, 
something Africa would dearly like to emulate. This alone does not afford China her 
diplomatic advantage in Africa, however; one needs to be cognisant of other power factors 
along the power continuum, inter alia, China’s financial clout and her friendship on the UN 
Security Council. Therefore, whilst analysing China’s use of instruments of power in Africa – 
specifically soft power, one needs to be aware of the fact that hard and soft power aren’t 
merely points at the opposite ends of a continuum, linked by some tenuous thread, but rather 
they are inextricably linked to each other and need to be considered as such. Lest we choose 
to forget the effects of statements like Donald Rumsfeld’s “I don’t know what it means”52; 
that the US is bogged down in her current Middle Eastern wars adds much to the meaning of 
this reply. 
 
It must also be noted that it is no coincidence that Nye’s soft power thesis was produced at 
the end of and was able to take root after the Cold War – before this the efficacy of soft power 
was relatively limited in Africa, a continent where realpolitik reigned supreme. While soft 
power was part of the American arsenal against the Soviet machine in Europe and other more 
developed countries, in Africa the hard rule of hard power reigned supreme, as demonstrated 
by the proxy wars that took place in the post-colonial era; even today this must be taken into 
account. As observed by Nye, the efficacy of soft power is enhanced when the disparities 
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between the states are minimised. In terms of both polity and economics, Africa is about as 
disparate from the developed world as one can be, and not only on an inter-continental basis, 
but also intra-continentally; this may disproportionately sway the power continuum towards 
the hard side. Additionally, this intra-continental disparity diminishes African states’ power, 
soft or hard. That has often been noted that China has an Africa policy, Africa does not have a 
China policy53 is indicative of the losing power struggle that Africa is playing. 
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Chapter Two 
 
Chinese Instruments of Power 
 
 
China’s foreign policy has proven to be exceptionally mutable since the end of the Chinese 
civil war after World War Two; this has been dictated to a great degree by the nature of the 
Chinese leadership – Mao representing the hardened ideological era, his successors choosing 
a more pragmatic route. China’s relationship with Africa through both these periods will be 
explored here, as well as China’s goals – regionally and internationally. The “China threat” 
will also be briefly addressed. 
 
In theory… 
 
In order to understand a state’s foreign policy objectives, one needs to understand the 
underlying theoretical principles that inform the international system, most prominently that 
of realism and liberalism. The post-Cold War era saw Fukuyama’s “End of History”, spelling 
out the end of the realist paradigm, a thesis vociferously rebuffed by Samuel P. Huntington’s 
“Clash of Civilisations” and Mearsheimer’s “Tragedy of Great Power Politics”. Mearsheimer 
proposes that the bipolar system of the Cold War era is the system that “produces the least 
amount of fear among the great powers”54. Liberals sought to explain this period not only in 
terms of a struggle for democracy but also in terms of economics55. The end of the Cold War 
era and the collapse of the bipolarity saw Huntington challenging Fukuyama, claiming that 
“[i]t is human to hate” and that humans need identity and acquire it through the enemies they 
choose56; he also attacked the more liberal views of globalism and the dissipation of the state, 
proposing that nation-states will remain the most powerful actors in world affairs, with the 
principle conflict occurring between nations and different civilisations57.  
 
The realist impression offered here is one of irreconcilable differences between states, that 
of a zero-sum game, and that foreign policy is distinctly based on these power relations. 
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Whilst representing a portion of the realist view, realists are not wholly averse to cooperation, 
and do not operate under a zero-sum belief all the time – here one needs to distinguish 
between offensive realists and defensive realists. In applying the prisoner’s dilemma model, 
Jervis finds that offensive realists such as Mearsheimer do not believe that prisoner's dilemma 
represents international politics because the model does not highlight the most crucial aspects 
of power, that of pursuit of security58. Defensive realists do not take this point of view, 
however, claiming that prisoner's dilemma includes the aspect of security insofar that the 
manner in which one state attempts to increase its security decreases the security of others – 
presenting us with the security dilemma59. 
 
In classical realist tradition, Morgenthau believes that the means of enacting power, that is to 
say foreign policy, is the primary method of understanding political and non-political facts, 
and that history bears out this assumption60. In the first of his “Six Principles of Political 
Realism” Morgenthau proposes that political realism is dictated by objective laws that have 
their roots in human nature, and that these laws are resistant to change61, and is an 
“autonomous sphere of action” independent from “other spheres, such as economics 
(understood in terms of interest defined as wealth), ethics, aesthetics, or religion”62. 
Cooperation under this paradigm is explained solely in terms of power, negating all non-
political facts that would prevent one from applying a systematic measure of order to the 
political sphere63. Classical realists focus on power does not, however, mean that they are 
necessarily belligerent. In assessing the 2003 Iraq war in terms of Morgenthau’s principles, 
Mearsheimer highlights the fact that realists believe that power exists in a world wherein 
balance is important64. By invading Iraq, the neoconservative movement believed they would 
precipitate a domino or cascading effect in the region; Morgenthau’s perspective would have 
been very different though, rather highlighting the fact that because of the balancing effect the 
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“Axis of Evil” powers would not automatically abandon their nuclear ambitions, but would in 
fact work harder to offset the threat of the US and to balance themselves against it65.  
 
Liberal foreign policy is best explained by Doyle best in terms of Kant’s “separate peace”, 
today usually referred as “democratic peace theory”. Democratic peace theory states that 
cooperation comes as a result of “economic rationalism” and that “free states”, that is to say 
those that enjoy economic and political freedom, demonstrate considerably less levels of 
conflict than “non-free” states66. Here is a fundamental clause of liberalism, the role of 
economics: it is posited that the higher the transnational relations, the higher the 
interdependence67. Doyle goes on to explain that Kant argues that cooperation may be 
achieved by means of three “definitive articles”, namely: the existence of a republican state – 
a political society that has mastered the art of “combining moral autonomy, individualism, 
and social order” and has addressed the issue of separation of powers; two: establishment of 
peace by means of a pacific union – that is to say a federation of free states that maintain the 
rights of all member states; and three: creation of a cosmopolitan law that defines “rules of 
hospitality”68. This theory questions the important realist claim that foreign policy is forever 
to be a tool of state security competition, and that the nature of the international system rather 
than the state type should inform us as to a states behaviour69.  
 
As dichotomous a front liberalism and realism present, they share what is viewed by some 
as a fundamental basis, that of rationalism. Wendt argues that this rationalism results in a 
fundamentally behavioural conception of both process and institutions, and this also leads 
neoliberals and neorealists to “share generally similar assumptions about agents: states are the 
dominant actors in the system, and they define security in "self-interested" terms”70. This 
criticism is particularly levelled at positivism, the quest for reliable, cumulative knowledge 
about the world, with the assumption that, ultimately, society and nature have the same 
                                                 
65 Loc Cit 
66 Doyle, M.W. “Liberalism and World Politics”. The American Political Science Review, Vol. 80, No. 4, p. 
1154 
67 Jackson, R. & Sørensen, G. Introduction to International Relations Theories, 2nd Edition, Oxford University 
Press, Oxford, 2003, p. 112 
68 Doyle, M.W. Op Cit, p. 1158 
69 Rosato, S. “The Flawed Logic of Democratic Peace Theory”.  The American Political Science Review, Vol. 
97, No. 4, p. 585 
70 Wendt, A. “Anarchy is what States Make of it: The Social Construction of Power Politics”. International 
Organisation, Vol. 46, No. 2, p. 392 
18 
 
quantifiable sources of behaviour71. That fundamental tenet of realism - anarchy - is called 
into question. Wendt believes that anarchy from the practises of states that create and 
instantiate a particular structure of identities and interests, rather than another72. 
Mearsheimer’s first “Bedrock Assumption” is that the international system is anarchic; an 
assumption that he assumes is sound and a “reasonably accurate representation of an 
important aspect of life in the international system”73. Parsimonious such an approach may be, 
however, it is an assumption that Mearsheimer chooses not to test, not even by means of the 
effect of economics on the international, which he insists is at all times subordinate to 
anarchy. What these criticisms of liberal and realist reductions of foreign policy demonstrate 
is that each on its own theory is necessarily limited, that the anarchical system truly seems to 
be what states make of it and is not statist, and the interactions of the economic system is 
predicated on reductionist beliefs of “economic man” similar to Hobbes’s aggressive man 
where individuals are depicted as existing as separate from nature. 
 
A mutable Chinese Foreign Policy 
 
Like all states, China’s means to attaining her foreign policy objectives are not immutable - 
they are how, however, reasonably predictable. This is for two reasons: firstly as defined by 
the theoretical schools of thought described above; secondly as outlined by means of explicit 
statements by the PRC dispensation74. These goals are, inter alia, to “preserve China's 
independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity” and create an environment conducive to 
her development on the world stage; this “harmonious policy” contrasts greatly with her 
ideologically based roots of the Maoist era. This evolution of foreign policy from its 
ideological beginning to her more economic oriented policies of today will now be tracked in 
order to understand the root of the relationships China is now able to take advantage of in 
Africa. 
 
Throughout the reign of Mao Tse-Tung, China’s African policy was geared to “exporting 
revolution”. Post civil war, Chinese foreign policy was significantly influenced by the 
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contemporary international environment and, accordingly, she placed herself at the forefront 
of the struggle against “colonialism, imperialism and revisionism in the Third World75; this 
situation was expedited by the Sino-Soviet split. Communist victory in 1949 saw China 
signing a “Treaty of Friendship and Alliance” with Russia in the following year, affording 
China significant support from her northern ally, financially as well as logistically. The 
Chinese borrowed heavily from the Soviet model, even emulating the Russian “Five-Year 
Plans” to stimulate industrialisation76. Mao played a more subordinate to the USSR, or more 
specifically to Stalin. Upon Khrushchev’s ascension to power and his relatively soft position 
vis-à-vis the United States, Mao saw China’s foreign policy diverging from that of Russia’s. 
This was noted as early as 1955, when the Soviets were not invited to the Bandung 
Conference of nonaligned nations, where the Chinese sought to establish themselves as the 
leaders of the emerging nonaligned group77. 
 
The Bandung Conference saw Africa being placed in an “intermediate zone”, that is to say 
neither socialist nor imperialist, in Mao’s view78. This was contrary to other communist views 
of the period who sought to include Africa as a main force against imperialism and 
hegemonism. The nature of Third World countries’ politico-social system was not conducive 
to altering the fundamental contradiction between the Third World and imperialism, 
according to China. Rather, by means of independence, liberation and revolution, the Chinese 
believed that these countries could be included in the resistance against imperialism and 
hegemonism, and the people’s rising political consciousness would precipitate a revolutionary 
force79. Accordingly, revolution “could not be exported” à la Che Guevara, its success 
depended more on the accumulation and expansion of revolutionary forces as well as on the 
domestic conditions within each country. By these means, China – in her limited military and 
financial capacity – was able to distinguish herself from the two superpowers thereby serving 
her non-alignment and neutralisation aspirations well. Complementing this was China’s 
nuclear stance in terms of arms control and disarmament: China’s declaration of “no first use” 
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of nuclear weapons and never using them against non-nuclear powers also gained significant 
Third World support for the PRC80. 
 
This is not to say China did not directly support any African struggles; China supplied 
important military aid under Mao’s rule, even while undergoing the strife of the Cultural 
Revolution at home. It is estimated that between 1955 and 1977 China sold $142 million 
worth of military equipment to Africa, accounting for 75% of all military aid to the 
continent81. Ultimately China’s intentions were ideological, however, primarily to counter the 
recognition of Taiwan as the Chinese representative at the UN, shoring up enough votes to 
oust the Taiwanese from the UN, of (marginal) secondary importance was the competition 
with the West and the USSR. The Soviet rivalry is best demonstrated by an “African Sino-
Soviet split” in support for revolutionary groups; in Zimbabwe China won out by supporting 
Robert Mugabe’s ZANU, while the Soviets backed the losing ZAPU under Joshua Nkomo82; 
whereas Angola saw China’s support of Jonas Savimbi’s UNITA bear less fruit. 
 
Until Mao’s passing, this means of ideological policy characterised China’s African 
relations. A new dispensation under Deng Xiaoping saw a more introspective China an 
interest in Africa waning. Deng introduced the “Four Modernisations” in China, requiring 
significant resources and manpower to be spent at home, thereby relegating Africa to a distant 
placing. This is not to imply that Africa was wholly cast aside. At the 12th CPC National 
Assembly, Chinese African policy was officially changed from one which stressed “war and 
revolution” to that of “peace and development”, as demonstrated by China’s Four Principles 
on Economic and Technological Cooperation with Africa, namely: equality and mutual 
benefit, stress on practical results, diversity in form, and attainment of common progress83. 
This was an attempt to camouflage a precipitous decline in foreign aid in the 1980s, China 
began to stress this South-South cooperation, in stark contrast to Zhou Enlai’s eight principles 
on Chinese foreign aid nineteen years previously, which had all but guaranteeing that Chinese 
aid would be the most generous in the world84. Given China’s now more limited financial 
capacity and focus on internal development, her relations with the two superpowers and the 
developed world took precedence; Africa took more of a rhetorical role with very little 
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economic significance. The period from 1981 to 1988 critically saw China’s GDP nearly 
doubling and annual trade growing from $4.4 billion to $10.3 billion. This was mostly due to 
interaction with the developed world, which all but came to a screeching halt in 1989. The 
Tiananmen Square crackdown saw the West balk at Chinese policy and, given the end of the 
USSR empire due to economic over-stretch, China was now significantly isolated. China saw 
that their close relationship with the West was now under threat sanctions and, most 
importantly, was open to criticism of affairs that China held to be sovereign. 
 
The general lack of criticism from the developing world, those neglected by China 
throughout most of the 1980s, was also noted by China. In the three years following the 
Tiananmen Square protests Chinese foreign minister Qian Qichan visited fourteen African 
states, setting in motion the Chinese diplomacy that we see today85. In the post-Tiananmen 
era, Africa afforded China many opportunities, namely: as a bulwark to the Taiwan question; 
numerical support in the UN General Assembly; and, after China became a net importer of oil 
in 1993, a more strategic resource supply86. The first two points noted above have 
significantly benefitted China insofar that Taiwan has been marginalised to such an extent that 
no developed or developing state of importance recognises the island’s claim to 
independence, and in terms of the latter, Africa’s representation in the UN is over one third 
and holds considerable voting sway in the UN, as well as in the WTO, a fact that China will 
and does leverage to great effect. The latter point of resource diplomacy will be dealt with in 
greater detail below. 
 
What is important to note is that while much has changed in the last three decades, much 
has also stayed the same. China still plays the south-south card, thereby creating a sense of 
camaraderie between developing African states and the emerging dragon, proposing that 
China may even be a developmental model for Africa87. The Chinese still prefer to maintain 
bilateral relations with African states88. China’s resolute stance with regards to sovereignty 
has also not wavered, most obviously demonstrated by any Tibetan or Taiwanese issues raised 
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in international fora. Respect for sovereignty is also a fundamental instrument of engagement 
for the Chinese dispensation, the weaknesses and strengths of this policy will be highlighted 
further on. Also of note are exogenous factors affecting Chinese foreign policy – China does 
not exist in a vacuum and today, China’s Africa policy is also affected by contemporary 
affairs, particularly those of the US who are still Africa’s single biggest trading partner. 
 
Chinese aspirations 
 
This leads us to question the raison d’être of Chinese foreign policy in Africa. In January 
2006 the Chinese government produced a document called “China’s Africa Policy”89. This six 
part manuscript outlines - in exceedingly diplomatic terms - China’s peaceful development 
path in terms of mutually beneficial cooperation, essentially an extension of the 
aforementioned “Four Principles”. Scratching below the surface of this document, cognisant 
of the theoretical outlines presented earlier, it will be presented that “mutually beneficial 
cooperation” is but one facet of China’s many foreign policy goals. 
 
The aforementioned resource diplomacy and political shoring up are important to China and 
most often referred to in contemporary academia and popular media; this is, however, a 
reductionist (and untenable) view. The goals and benefits may be inferred from China’s 
relations with her eleven ethnically, politically and economically diverse Southeast Asian 
partners. The PRC stated they are:  
 
“persisting in building good-neighborly relationships and partnerships with the 
neighboring countries, … pursu[ing] a policy of bringing harmony, security and prosperity 
to neighbours and and dedicate ourselves to strengthening mutual trust and cooperation 
with the fellow Asian countries, easing up hot spot tensions and tranquillity in Asia.”90 
 
China fully demonstrated this commitment during the 1997 Asian financial crisis when they 
did not devalue their currency, which would have severely impacted on her neighbours, 
thereby adopting a significant political and economic role in the region91. However, of 
particular importance was China’s relationship with the United States when, in 2001, China 
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chose to change regional policy so as to avoid direct criticism or opposition to American 
policies in the region92. China has even assured Southeast Asian elites of their support for 
territorial status quo, an important bone of contention in the region, thus transforming herself 
from a feared state to that of partner93. Given the nature of bilateral relations, ironically China 
is moving away from this manner of regional relations in Southeast Asia, viewing such 
arrangement as a “holdover from the Cold War”, and wants to institute a multilateral security 
framework94. Noteworthy is the shift in regional perception of China, away from that of the 
“China threat” to that of “friendly elephant”, in stark contrast to the perception of the US 
under the Bush regime. 
 
Here is what we find most crucial in modern Chinese foreign policy, that of “soft power”. 
Joseph Nye noted in 1990 that “the great powers of today are less able to use their traditional 
power resources to achieve their purposes than in the past”, and that there were at least five 
trends that contributed to the diffusion of power, namely: economic interdependence, 
transnational actors, nationalism in weak states, the spread of technology, and changing 
political issues95. Soft power is what Nye posits as the substitute for the older, realist 
paradigms that have traditionally dominated foreign policy, defining it as “when one country 
gets other countries to want what it wants”96. Nye’s original definition of soft power is very 
strict, not allowing for any carrots, such as economic incentives, and has also been criticised 
for lacking clarity and for being unquantifiable97. This American-centric view, however, 
results in a rejection China’s version of soft power, because the American version of soft 
power is based on the political ideals she espouses, most notably a rights-based democratic 
system and individual and human rights98, neither of which feature strongly on the PRC 
dispensation’s radar. 
 
China seeks to use soft power as a basis to build up its desired international order. To 
achieve these ends, President Hu Jintao, upon presenting the aforementioned “harmonious 
world policy”, proposed: 
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• The importance of multilateralism to realise common security objectives 
• Settlement of international disputes by means of negotiations and consultation 
• Mutually beneficial cooperation amongst developed nations in order to facilitate 
common prosperity 
• The spirit of “inclusiveness” must be advocated, thereby making coexistence 
possible.99 
China understands that at this moment her hard power resources are inferior to the other 
major powers, and rationally chooses this path as it is the best means of development for her. 
In dealing with nations in the global south, whose hard power is significantly weaker than 
China’s, the PRC is taking an increasingly pragmatic stance. By virtue of the fact that so 
many developing states have been marginalised by either the US or the international financial 
institutions (IFI’s), such as the World Bank and IMF, China has quite easily been able to re-
establish ties from her ideological era 
 
For African states, over and above Western isolation, China’s status as the world's greatest 
developing power is especially attractive, a fact that China ably exploits. Superficial analyses 
would propose that importing the Chinese model of development would be wholly 
advantageous for African, with Robert Mugabe noting in 2005 that “[w]e must turn our faces 
to the East, where the sun rises”100. The appeal of Chinese development is often based on the 
comparison of post-World War Two Sino level of development and Africa’s post-
independence levels, where it is noted that they are on similar levels. China makes the most of 
this situation by invoking the sovereignty card, deliberately decoupling economic relations 
from political reform, in direct opposition to Western forms of cooperation. This is clearly an 
issue not only for Western states who are loathe to deal with ‘dubious’ African government, 
but also for their industries who are either prohibited from doing business in these states or 
are encountering Chinese State Owned Enterprises (SOE’s) who, under the auspices of the 
Chinese dispensation, are less concerned with making a profit and rather seek penetration into 
untapped markets. 
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That China “respects state sovereignty” is also particularly attractive to many developing 
states, and is in fact the ideological cover used by the Chinese state as part of it resource 
diplomacy and construction of diplomatic ties. The flaw in this assertion, however, is that the 
states with which China carries out her duties, a policy so wholly predicated on sovereignty, 
are anything but sovereign; China is in fact dealing with “quasi-states”. In claiming 
sovereignty, a state (in the Weberian sense) must possess the ability – or even be inclined – to 
meet the socio-economic needs of the citizenry, buttressed by an independent judicial 
system101. This argument is best demonstrated by the case of Eritrea who, by virtue of their 
intense defence of their sovereignty, ought to be ideal Chinese allies. In this case, sovereignty 
seems rather to hamper Beijing’s aspirations, seeing as she has little or no influence over the 
Eritrean government102. That is to say Chinese dealings with Africa, whilst predicated on 
sovereignty, seem to be conducted with states with the most spurious claim to such. 
Additionally, Chinese reasoning for invoking sovereignty needs examining: the challenging of 
sovereignty in any state is vociferously challenged by China; should such a precedent be 
established, China may see international involvement in her Taiwan, Tibetan and Xinjiang 
issues. China is not the only sovereignty obsessed state, it must be noted; Russia, by virtue of 
her “break-away state”, Chechnya is also an ardent sovereignty proponent. Both these states 
have demonstrated this by blocking Sudanese sanctions in the past103. One might also note 
that it is not only Beijing that does not support UN Security Council Resolutions with regards 
to Sudan; Resolution 1593 (2005) also had the US and Brazil listed as abstentions in referring 
the situation in Darfur to the International Criminal Court104. Whilst China has a history of 
abstentions at the UN Security Council, these are usually in issues that will not impede on her 
foreign affairs or issues that will impact on the sacred alter of sovereignty. That China is 
(relatively) more acquiescent in the Sudan issue is not necessarily indicative of a more 
cooperative China in the international system, but rather a more pragmatic stance on behalf of 
Beijing; international pressure bore down on China, especially in the run up to the 2008 
Olympic games, and China also saw possible economic sacrifices. In the post-Great 
Recession era, one would be hard pushed to believe China would concede quite so easily 
 
                                                 
101 Taylor, I. “China’s Oil Diplomacy in Africa”. International Affairs, Vol. 82, No. 5, p. 955 
102 Loc Cit 
103 “Russia, China Block Sudan Sanctions”, retrieved 12 January 2010 from 
http://www.globalpolicy.org/component/content/article/168/39703.html 
104 United Nations Resolution 1593 (2005), retrieved 1 June 2010 from http://daccess-dds-
ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N05/292/73/PDF/N0529273.pdf?OpenElement 
26 
 
In light of the changing nature of China’s penetration into Africa, the “China threat” thesis 
has become more prominent. Her insistence on “respecting” sovereignty even in dictatorial 
states has been seen as a manoeuvre by some to just surreptitiously gain access to resources, 
whereas China maintains that “[t]here are no rogue states. China has been labelled this in the 
past and other governments should not criticize”105. Chinese strategies, as proposed by realist 
thinkers, are that she seeks security in both the political and economic fields. Mearsheimer 
proposes that China will seek regional hegemony, thereby displacing the United States, and 
also maximise the gap between itself and its neighbours, namely Russia and Japan106, 
ultimately imposing a “Monroe Doctrine for East Asia” of sorts for the Chinese. China, 
realists would have us believe, will also seek security further afield, namely Africa. As 
already noted, Africa could (and often does) provide China with a significant number of 
political votes, and Africa’s resource wealth is of growing importance to a voracious Chinese 
economy. The Chinese strategies that have seen her influence rise in Africa are: lower risk-
averseness by Chinese firms versus their Western counterparts, especially in unstable regions 
such as the Democratic Republic of Congo, Angola, and disputed oil fields in Nigeria; the 
Chinese focus on specific sectors, particularly infrastructure, where there is a dearth of 
Western interest; and Chinese willingness to pursue relations with states that have been turned 
into niche markets by the West due to sanctions and afford China a free-riding opportunity, as 
in Sudan and Zimbabwe107. Taylor, however, notes that “common sense” needs to be applied 
when assessing Chinese-African ties and three realities need to be borne in mind108. Firstly 
China is not a unitary actor: that China is swathed in corruption and weak rule of law at home 
is indicative of the fact that China lacks the capacity to direct this “China Inc.”, Chinese trade 
ties have actually become more “normalised” according to Taylor. China is being made into a 
scapegoat, is the second point made – that China is taking advantage of a “helpless continent” 
by flooding Africa with cheap labour and goods and exploiting the populace through the 
dubious African regimes. The article argues that many Africans cannot provide these skills at 
the moment and that the collapsed markets that China is now selling to were that way long 
before the Chinese arrived – due to Western influence. Finally that it is up to African states to 
manage African-Chinese relations, China’s function is not to “look out” for other states’ well 
being. Taylor too goes on to pointedly note that while China has an Africa policy, Africa does 
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not have a China policy109. This is in stark contrast to Singapore who, by virtue of their 
proximity to Beijing and other better endowed states, was acutely aware of their foreign 
relations and the possibly pernicious side-effects thereof. 
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Chapter Three 
 
Singapore in Review 
 
 
Singapore’s foreign policy is particular interest to Africa for a multitude of reasons. Firstly, 
Singapore shares a colonial past with Africa, that of being under the control of the British 
Empire. The island state gained independence in the 1960s and her foreign policy was also 
shaped in the Cold War era. A significant distinction between Africa and Singapore is the 
resources endowed to both. The former is well endowed in natural and human resources; the 
latter is afforded none of these. This chapter will introduce Singapore’s foreign policy, track 
its evolution, and analyse how it interacts with China. Particular attention will be paid to the 
rule of law dispensation and how it facilitated Singapore’s interaction with China and 
influenced development in the city-state. Finally it will highlight the generalisability 
shortcomings when inferring from Singapore to Angola. 
 
Realpolitik of a vulnerable state 
  
Realpolitik is the most common discourse when referring to Singapore foreign policy. Upon 
their unanticipated separation from Malaysia in 1965, Singapore immediately experienced a 
sense of vulnerability as a result of the absence of a protective British military110. The ruling 
party, the People’s Action Party (PAP), has consistently represented the separation with 
Malaysia as an eviction and has facilitated intense suspicion and antipathy between the 
polities of the two states. Additionally, a resolution between Malaysia and Indonesia in 
August 1966 highlighted ethnic divides between Singapore and her neighbours; the former 
comprising 76 percent ethnic Chinese, whilst the latter are ethnic Malay111. Ideology, 
however, holds very little sway in Singaporean foreign policy resulting in what is 
occasionally considered “schizophrenic” or even “oxymoronic” foreign policy112. This is ably 
demonstrated by an initial declaratory commitment to non-alignment and a denunciation of 
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US involvement in Vietnam; six months later, however, Singapore provided American forces 
with rest and recreation bases in the war113. 
 
Singapore is also one of the smaller and lesser endowed states in the region and therefore 
needs to rely on nimbleness and litheness in its foreign policy. The city-state is a mere 648 
square kilometres with permanent resident population of approximately 3.2 million people114. 
Unlike some resource rich small Middle Eastern states, Singapore lacks any significant 
resources, and in actual fact even relies on Malaysia for a constant water supply. In 1966, 
Singapore’s first foreign minister, Sinnathamby Rajaratnam, noted that the fundamental 
problem facing Singapore was: 
 
 “how to make sure that a small nation with a teeming population and no natural 
resources to speak of, can maintain, even increase, its living standards and also enjoy 
peace and security in a region marked by mutual jealousies, internal violence, economic 
disintegration and great power conflicts.”115 
 
This relative lack of national endowments as well as external threats combined to produce a 
“siege mentality” according to Leifer, who insists that Singapore then adopted an image of a 
“poison shrimp” – small, not invulnerable, but by no means a pushover116. The shrimp 
analogy symbolises a Singaporean state that may be bested in confrontation, but will inflict 
significant damage on any state that it faces. That Singapore displayed such a hard-nosed 
policy virtually from day one indicates that this policy did not emerge from nowhere. Whilst 
the system may be considered sui generis, it is underpinned by a high level of authority – a 
legacy of Singapore’s colonial years. Typically, ex-colonial states often suffer from “colonial 
hangover”, characterised, inter alia, by weak states and xenophobia. Singapore, on the other 
hand, made no fetish out of rubbing out their colonial record and history, they chose rather to 
recognise the British legacy of high standards of professionalism and probity in public117. 
Under the British protectorate, Singapore’s primary role was that of entrept and a minimal 
industrial base; whilst this may have all but vanished, Singapore was a booming metropolis 
                                                 
113 Leifer, M. “The Conduct of Foreign policy”, in Management of Success: The Moulding of Modern 
Singapore, Sandhu, K.S. & Wheatley, P. (Eds.)Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, Singapore, 1989, p. 969 
114 Leifer, M. (2000) Op Cit, p. 10 
115 Tan, S.S. Op Cit, p. 25 
116 Leifer, M. as cited in Tan, S.S. Ibid, p. 22 
117 Leifer, M. (2000) Op Cit, p. 11 
30 
 
pre-independence and its post-independence economic development certainly benefitted 
significantly from these strong foundations118. 
 
All the references to the vulnerability leads one to believe that hard core realism underpins 
the foreign policy (and internal policy) of Singapore. This Hobbesian school of thought was 
propounded as recently as 1997, with Foreign Minister, Professor S. Jayakumar noting that 
“[t]he dynamics of international relations bears a striking resemblance to the laws of the 
jungle; not all creatures are created equal and only the fittest survive”119. That Singapore has 
since 1966 identified the primary task of foreign policy as the safeguarding of the nation’s 
nascent independence from “external threats”, underscores this Hobbesian bent. Additionally, 
this is also demonstrated by Singapore’s use of hard power, a power that is supposed to be the 
domain of middle and great powers alone. Singapore, however, chose to use hard power to 
reduce the vulnerability of the city-state by: 
 
• Strengthening national defence capability; 
• Entering into defence arrangements with other states either on a bilateral, 
special multilateral or regional basis; 
• Underpinning security through economic growth by adopting sound national 
policies as well as advancing regional cooperation; 
• Promoting internal cohesion; and 
• Adopting a sound diplomacy at both the bilateral and multilateral levels.120 
 
To these ends, Singapore has signed a number of military agreements, including, amongst 
others: border Military-Security Cooperation with its immediate neighbours, especially 
Malaysia and Indonesia; Intelligence Sharing with most ASEAN states as well as important 
strategic partners such as the United States, United Kingdom and Australia; investment in the 
Five Powers Defense Arrangement, which, in addition to Singapore, involves the UK, 
Australia, New Zealand and Malaysia – the United Kingdom chose to utilise this as part of a 
decolonisation exercise whereby it retained a military presence in the region, even though its 
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troops were withdrawn in 1971121. Here we find a crucial characteristic of Singapore’s foreign 
policy, it “borrowing” external had power to shore up its security, because whilst Singapore 
may seem to ascribe religiously to realist dogma, she is not blind to the benefits of regional 
cooperation. 
 
By the 1970s, Singapore’s foreign policy had matured to the extent that it had come to be 
distinguished by a quality of authority so that it held sway amongst its neighbours and was 
taken cognisance of. Whilst often punching above her weight, Singapore is acutely aware of 
her stretch and even the possibility of overstretch, understanding that “[she] has little capacity 
of its own to shape the main course of world events… [e]ssentially, for its survival and 
economic well-being, its foreign policy has to respond to the realities of the regional and 
international environment”122; to counter this Singapore promotes regional fora as a means of 
balancing power – a significant foreign policy tool. In order to facilitate such balance of 
power objectives, Singapore, as noted above, has entered into multiple security arrangements. 
However, liberal theory has to be applied here too, in terms of economics. Realism’s dearth of 
explanatory power lies in it ascribing too much influence to power, limiting its ability to 
account for the efficacy of multilateralism and regionalism and the benefit of economics. As 
Ganesan notes: 
 
A clear core of realist self-reliance is layered with the demands of a competitive trading 
state that requires a liberal international trading regime. Hence both competitive and 
cooperative philosophies undergird Singapore’s foreign policy. Accordingly, whereas 
Singapore’s preoccupation with vulnerability is an enduring feature of policy output, it 
is arguable that cooperation and prosperity are better obtained through liberal 
arrangements.123 
 
To these liberal ends, Singapore has formed economic cooperative relations with regional 
powers, including China – over and above the security arrangements with the US, Singapore 
also has significant economic ties with America; American investment in Singapore amounts 
to $40 billion, Chinese investments at 2007 had yet to crack the $1 billion barrier124.  
 
                                                 
121 Ibid, p. 19 
122 Leifer, M (1989), p. 965 
123 Ganesan, N. Realism and Interdependence in Singapore’s Foreign Policy, Routledge, London, 2005, p. 2  
124 Kurlantzick, J. Charm Offensive, Yale University, New York, 2007, p. 87 
32 
 
Singapore has also used economics in lieu of diplomacy; Singapore utilised the Bank of 
China in the city-state as a means of unofficial diplomatic contact until a trade office was 
opened in 1981125. Singapore, like Beijing, presents a bifurcative policy – delinking politics 
from economics, this allowed them to establish economic ties with Taiwan, while not entering 
into formal consular relations with the island; Singapore ascribed to the one-China policy 
from the outset, and China was, therefore, not an obstacle in terms of regional association in 
Southeast Asia126. What is less evident, however, is that Singapore’s realism is less faithful to 
the classical definition, but so is her ascription to liberal economics somewhat muddied, and 
here we find somewhat of a misnomer when separating economics and politics. Both realist 
and liberal oriented theories, to a greater or lesser extent, see “low” economic issues as a 
starting point, this, according Ripsman, is a non sequitur, noting that arguments separating the 
low politics of economics from the high politics of national security were overstated127. He 
goes on to argue, firstly, that economics are the underpinnings of military might and national 
security; second, that it exaggerates the independence states have from the international 
economy when mobilising economic resources in support of security objectives; and finally it 
does not account for states who may use economic means in an interdependent world to 
achieve national security objectives, by means of sanctions or economic incentives for 
example128. 
 
Balancing of power demonstrates how Singapore combines politics and economics. As 
noted by Deputy Prime Minister, Lee Hsien Loong, Singapore’s balance of power strategy 
depended not on linking Singapore’s fortunes to one overbearing partner, but rather depended 
on the competing interests of several big powers in the region. By these means, the big 
powers kept each other in check, “allow[ing] small states to survive in the interstices between 
them” 129. Instead of seeking to counter each potential hegemon, Singapore chooses to rather 
assess whether or not a potential or actual hegemon is a benign or malign factor for the city-
state130. The most strategic and enduring of these hegemons has been the United States. For 
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Singapore, the US is unmatched as a security guarantor and key balancer in Asia, sans 
American influence, Singapore would most likely be at risk131. 
 
Hedging is an important balance of power instrument for Singapore. In international 
relations, hedging involves strategies aimed at avoiding a situation wherein states cannot 
decide on more straightforward alternatives such as balancing, bandwagoning, or neutrality132. 
Rather, hedging allows Singapore to adopt a middles position, avoiding choosing either side 
at the expense of the other. The phrase has often been applied the manner in which Japan and 
other Southeast Asian nations have chosen to engage China: often deepening security ties 
with the US as well as taking part in multilateral institutions so as to facilitate constructive 
Chinese participation in regional issues133; the latter in the hope that China will eventually 
develop a vested interest in regional security and be compelled to participate at a multilateral 
level. The efficacy of hedging will depend on a state’s geography, military and economic 
power, and the perception of threat, and is both an offensive and defensive strategy. Singapore 
literally finds herself at a crossroads in the region; she is deeply connected to Western finance 
and business interests, yet rooted in Asian cultures134; Singapore is able to use this to good 
effect in terms of hedging as she has “a foot in both camps”. 
 
These common points of interest facilitate Singapore’s soft power in the region. The term 
“global city” challenges the staunchly realist paradigm directed at Singapore. This 
demonstrates that Singapore’s foreign policy is not wholly defined by balance of power and 
self-help considerations, but is also informed by soft power considerations that would attract 
the interest of other powers. The aforementioned crossroads afford Singapore the opportunity 
of being a “land of opportunity”135 in the region as well as being an exemplar for the region. 
This is clearly demonstrated by Deng Xiaoping who, in 1978, acknowledged Singapore as a 
model of economic development and political economy and even saw Singapore as a counter 
to Soviet regional influence136. 
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The global city uses numerous soft power methods, even those of security linked to 
traditional hard power have been softened in the last few decades, especially in light of 
worsening relations with its immediate neighbours in the late 1980s and post-Cold War. 
Singapore’s traditional concerns with regard to vulnerability led to a security dilemma in the 
region which came to a head in 1988, leading defence minister Goh Chok Tong to note that a 
strong defence capability was important, but Singapore was not a threat to the region, noting 
that: 
 
A defense policy based only on deterrence will end up like two strangers staring at one 
another in the face. Each misreads the other’s stare. Suspicious thoughts go through 
their minds, ending up very often in punches. The staring analogy teaches us that the 
force of arms alone cannot keep the peace.137 
 
Singapore would not viably give up its defence arrangements; rather it chose to invest in 
defence diplomacy as a supplement to its strong but untested military. Over and above the 
aforementioned military arrangements that have been developed, Singapore also assists other 
countries, especially its neighbours in times of crisis138. The Association of Southeast Asian 
Nations (ASEAN) allows Singapore to employ methods of regionalism; ASEAN may be seen 
as an embryonic security community or, less ambitiously, as an extant diplomatic community. 
Additionally, ASEAN provides Singapore the framework within which cooperative relations 
with neighbours as well as where wider ASEAN-based regionalisms are concerned139. That 
Singapore is the most trade dependent state in the region, means that it benefits significantly 
under ASEAN6 trade agreements wherein tariff lines of over 20% pre-2005 were dropped to 
5% by 2009 and are set to fall to zero in 2010, with certain ‘‘sensitive’’ products having 
longer phase-out periods140. 
 
The China Connection 
 
China-Singapore relations are complicated not only by the proximity of the city-state to 
China, but also by the majority of ethnic Chinese that reside in Singapore. Sometimes referred 
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to as the “third China” after mainland China and Taiwan, Singaporean policy makers are 
acutely aware of the near 76% ethnic Chinese that constitutes its population141. This effect 
should not be played down as, even during Singapore’s colonial period, these ethnic Chinese 
maintained a strong separate cultural identity and strong links with their ancestral land by 
means of remittances142. China, whilst acknowledging that “Chinese Singaporeans are citizens 
of Singapore”, have gently prodded the city-state by routinely visiting Singapore on fact-
finding missions, affording millions Chinese tourists Singapore as a travel destination, and 
promoting Singapore for education and employment, thereby attempting to deepen the 
cultural roots the Chinese have in Singapore143. On a less soft note, China is not averse to 
castigating Singapore, noting once that “one thousand three hundred million Chinese are very 
angry” with Singapore144. Reciprocally, Singapore has not acquiesced to the Chinese 
dispensation, condemning the Chinese over the Tiananmen massacre and, more recently, after 
Singapore’s Prime Minister designate visited Taiwan, the “explosion of anger” from Beijing 
and subsequent cancellation of Chinese visits to Singapore did not bow the city-state into 
submission145. Reflecting the “vulnerable” domestic political scene, Singapore has even 
developed a reputation of crushing its internal communist opponents, thereby differentiating 
itself even further from China146. 
 
These may suggest strained ties between the two nations; however both are aware of the 
underlying tensions and, more applicable to Singapore, the importance of maintaining good 
diplomatic relations with each other. Singapore is cognisant of not only the economic benefits 
of successfully engaging the Chinese dispensation, but also in terms of general security 
benefits; in fact this pragmatic and inconsistent characteristic of Singapore foreign policy 
efficiently explains Singapore-Chinese relations. China’s sheer enormity in the region cannot 
be ignored by Singapore and therefore heightens Singapore’s already keen sense of 
vulnerability. Singapore has chosen two methods to assuage this feeling of vulnerability, 
namely the aforementioned security arrangements it has entered with numerous others, 
especially the United States, and engaging China in regional fora and ensuring that China has 
a vested interest in the region.  
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As with Singapore, many other states, particularly the US, are concerned with the “China 
threat”. John Mearsheimer proposes that China and the US are likely to engage in an intense 
security competition in the next few decades, with a high likelihood of war. Mearsheimer 
predicates this thesis on American history, and how by virtue of her “Manifest Destiny” she 
grew to become an expansionist power of the first order147. Thus, true to realist dogma, 
Mearsheimer insists that China will seek to maximise the power gap between itself and its 
neighbours, and try push the United States out of Asia. China, however, continues to promote 
the image of a “Peaceful Rise”. Singapore’s concerns include the intent and capacity of China 
to disrupt regional stability and prosperity, delimit Singapore’s policy choices, and upset 
ASEAN cohesion148 Singapore, whilst aware of its “vulnerability” and the military threat 
China may possibly represent, understands that in the short-term economics are central and a 
successful China best serves Southeast Asia. Therefore, contemporary wisdom holds that 
economic liberalisation will precipitate political liberalisation. This will come about as a 
result of the growth of a middle class that is educated, becoming more affluent and will 
demand “Western political freedoms”, an independent judiciary and an end to the corruption 
that is rife149. This school of thought proposes that an economically acquiescent China will 
integrate into the world system and not ascend in any belligerent manner. 
 
Given the higher order nature of military politics, Singapore has yet to develop the trust 
necessary with China to build up military alliances. Singapore, being more obstinate than her 
ASEAN contemporaries, has sought to encourage Beijing to increase her transparency in 
terms of military plans150. China has even offered Singapore training facilities on the island of 
Hainan, as a substitute to Taiwan, Singapore declined the offer noting that they were “always 
willing to listen, but any decision on Hainan could not impinge on existing [training] 
relationships”151; thus any sophisticated military equipment is purchased from the US or 
Western Europe. This may prove to be problematic in the future, especially as China’s 
influence in the region grows, as the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) is the only 
security forum serving Central Asia – and is headed by China. 
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Singapore does vociferously promote regionalism via ASEAN, however, as well as other 
pan-Asian regional organisations, such as APEC, ARF, ASEAN+3, and most recently EAS; 
this engagement policy is referred to as “binding engagement” or “omni-enmeshment” 152. 
Additionally, Singapore not only seeks to enmesh China in the system, but also hopes that 
China will uphold the regional status quo. ASEAN suits both Singapore and China’s policies 
in terms of respect of sovereignty, as the association has demonstrated a longstanding 
commitment to non-interference and a gradualist approach to regionalism153. Singapore’s trust 
in ASEAN was minimal until the 1970s; it viewed the forum as a weak instrument for 
economic cooperation and a possible medium of hegemony for Indonesia. Within a 
multilateral context, though, it became apparent to Singapore that even seemingly 
insignificant states could wield power and disproportionate influence based on their 
willingness to shoulder a large share of diplomatic burden154. Singapore also seeks to employ 
“cooperative security”, whereby tensions are relieved by improving the overall regional 
climate rather than through direct attention to problem-solving and defence cooperation155; 
this too is appealing as direct attention impinges too much on sovereignty for the Chinese. 
 
So as not to impinge on sovereignty, Singapore chooses to explicitly separate “high” and 
“low” politics, thereby engaging China on economic terms. While China was only 
Singapore’s fifth largest trading market, comprising of eight percent of exports, trade with the 
Greater China region (Hong Kong, Taiwan, and China) amounted to $19.4 billion – exceeding 
Singapore-US trade for 2004156. Singaporean investment in China accounted for thirteen 
percent of direct investment abroad, making Singapore China’s seventh-largest investor, 
primarily in manufacturing and real estate157. Singapore, however, is acutely aware of the 
growth potential of future trade with Beijing, especially in light of the 2008 credit crunch. 
One also need note that China surpassed the United States with ASEAN; a free trade 
agreement (FTA) signed between China and ASEAN in 2002 that is currently being 
implemented, will boost this trade even more, thereby enhancing China’s influence in the 
region158. This may impact on security arrangements Singapore has with America because, as 
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noted earlier, economics ultimately underpins a state’s military might and as China’s 
influence grows in the region, she may begin attach conditionalities with her economic clout. 
 
Moreover, small states, and especially Singapore in light of her severe lack of natural 
resources, tend to be vulnerable to external events and also tend to be price takers, and 
therefore have less influence in terms of setting the terms and conditions of trade relations159. 
Singapore’s primary instrument of defence is its strong government, that colonial hangover, 
which cognisant of long-term objectives and is not bound by four-year time frame160. This is 
significant as democracy has been touted as the best path for development by Western powers 
for decades now, especially in the post-Cold War era. What Singapore demonstrates, 
however, is more of a “benevolent dictator” or rather rule of law. Wei Pan notes, when 
analysing the possibility of democracy emerging in China, that rule of law suits the current  
regime as it maintains the system of one party rule that is “aimed at meeting the need of 
economic reform and reclaiming legitimacy based on improving the people’s standards of 
living rather than on ideological correctness and mass-mobilization”161. In distinguishing 
“rule of law” from “democracy, or rule of people”, Pan highlights that the two clearly indicate 
different paradigms, and one could exist without the other. He explains their essential 
differences as follows: 
 
1. Democracy and rule of law differ in political philosophy. The former entrusts “good 
governance” to the extensiveness of political participation out of people’s concern 
for their welfares – the root cause of the people’s demand for power. Rule of law 
entrusts good governance to limiting the power of the government, as defined by 
Basic Laws, so that people enjoy unrestricted liberty under these defined laws. 
Significantly, rule of law is not swayed by partisan politics as in most modern 
democracies 
2. The fundamental approaches of the two differ. Democracy authorises an elected few 
to govern the majority by means of consent. Rule of law is designed to regulate 
government instead of creating government. As in a democracy, rule of law relies on 
separation of powers so as to ensure accountability, however, rule of law tells 
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government what it may do and does not allow it to manipulate the law to its own 
ends. 
3. As a result of their different approaches, the two differ in political agenda as well. 
Democracy focuses on law making by means of majority within the polity. Rule of 
law emphasises law enforcement so long as it is constitutional, that is to say 
compliant with Basic Laws. 
4. Their sources of power are also different. Rule of law consists of non-elected law 
enforcement offices, whereas democracy relies on elected law making offices. 
5. Because of the abovementioned point, democracy and rule of law differ radically in 
game rules. The former features regular elections plus relative majority votes, whilst 
the latter regular examinations plus constant evaluations. Partisan interests, 
therefore, may dominate the democratic system, while rule of law sets up a more 
efficient system of accountability.162 
 
Rule of law dispensations have been compared to democracies and been found to operate 
better, according to Pan. He uses the cases of Singapore and Hong Kong versus Taiwan, 
strengthening the validity of Pan’s comparisons is the fact that all three of these states are 
mostly ethnic Chinese, thereby precluding (to some extent) the extraneous Western variable. 
Post 1997 Hong Kong and Singapore are characterised by a government power that is 
efficiently separated from law making so as to ensure an effective mechanism of checks and 
balances, making the Law above any one person or power – says Pan163. Taiwan, on the other 
hand, is split by partisan politics, negatively impacting on the efficacy of rule of law, which 
democracies claim to support. He also goes on to highlight that Hong Kong and Singapore are 
the two least corrupt regimes in East Asia. 
 
Underpinning regionalism is trade, the life-blood of Singapore; exports and imports are 
more than twice Singapore’s GDP164, demonstrating Singapore’s vulnerability and 
dependence on trade. Conversely, a number of states have a stake in Singapore as a result of a 
Cold War policy that sought to attract multi-national corporations to the state. That 
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Singapore’s economy is the most open in the world informs their reliance in and promotion of 
a multi-lateral system - ASEAN and the World Trade Organisation (WTO) are therefore 
crucial to Singapore’s foreign policy strategy, as these organisations are seen to uphold and 
enforce the rules of the trade system. Given that Singapore has no “attractive” resources to 
speak of, and she is limited to promoting her talent, technology and tolerance to other states. 
The efficacy of such a policy is limited, and therefore Singapore continuously seeks to find a 
balance between safeguarding her vulnerable status and her significant reliance on the region. 
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Chapter Four 
 
Angola’s Precarious Position 
 
 
Attached to most international loans is the requirement of democratic reform, a condition that 
most African states loathe; this will be contextualised in terms of the Angolan dispensation. 
With or without democratic reform, Angolan diplomatic and economic interactions with the 
West will continue alongside the Chinese, whose financing practices will be discussed next, 
by means of the China Export-Import bank. Angola’s biggest trading partners are still the EU 
and the US, the importance of this will be briefly noted. 
 
Angolan democracy 
 
Most democratic reform throughout Africa has not occurred without significant external 
pressure being applied; this pressure has varied with the nature of the international political 
system. The effect of the Cold War, and the proxy war in post-independent Angola in 
particular, saw development and democracy taking a back seat to realpolitik. Angola 
demonstrates this perfectly, suffering the effects of a much delayed colonial struggle, 
followed by a proxy war until the end of the 1980s, and then descending into civil war after 
the disputed 1992 elections, precipitated by José Eduardo dos Santos’s reneging on the 
electoral rules that stated that the failure of any candidate to secure more than fifty percent of 
the vote would result in an election run-off165. Relative peace in 2002 came about as a result 
of the death of UNITA’s leader, Jonas Savimbi, and saw parliamentary elections taking place 
in 2008 – albeit of somewhat disputed legitimacy. 
 
The 2008 elections were, according to dos Santos, going to be an example to Africa; Pawson 
maintains that they were significantly more166. She notes that the elections were an example 
rather on how to hold faux democratic elections, whilst “annihilat[ing] the opposition and 
regress[ing] to a one-party state”167. An EU observer mission stated that the elections failed to 
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meet international standards, demonstrating pro-government bias in radio, print, and 
television; but the same report goes on to note that the poll was peaceful and displayed the 
electorates “clear commitment to the country’s democratic process and desire to leave behind 
a past marked by decades of war and civil conflict.”168 Significantly, the 2008 elections were 
not followed by a civil war à-la 1992, influenced in part by the fact that approximately half of 
the electorate were born after 1974, mitigating any direct colonial or bush war experiences, 
with the 1992 elections also having less influence169. Common electoral issues arose as well, 
however170; the National Electoral Commission (CNE) tasked with the oversight and 
coordination of the elections consisted of a central panel, with six of the eleven members as 
politically proportionate representation and the remaining five as government/MPLA 
appointees, and therefore severely skewed in the MPLA’s favour – undermining the CNE’s 
credibility171. That the MPLA also had unequal access to state funding further highlights the 
inefficiencies of the 2008 elections; the government restricted access to opposition party 
funding whilst allowing the MPLA to start campaigning with said funds over and above 
additional donor funds up to four months before the opposition were afforded access to their 
funding172. Additionally, Human Rights Watch goes on to highlight the following oversights: 
unequal access to public facilities and spaces, government obstruction of independent national 
observers, and irregularities in conduct of voting, counting, and tabulation173. Again, this begs 
the question of a Western democratic system in an African country that had the Weberian 
state thrust upon it. 
 
That portions of the population remains armed and did not move to arms, indicates either 
reasonable satisfaction with the 2008 elections or a placated populace, however; by what 
means the Angolan dispensation either satisfies or placates the populace is of importance. In 
terms of the former, it would typically come about as a result of normal democratic processes 
where the government would feel accountable to its voters and an efficient allocation of 
resources would take place; the latter would come about as a result of an unempowered, 
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poorly educated populace who expect very little from the government or, worse, fear the 
government. Western governments and NGO’s insist this last point is being facilitated by the 
Chinese loans, and a function of what has become the typical African resource curse. 
 
Over and above the question of legitimacy of the 2008 elections, one need question the 
effect of the elections; dos Santos has postponed the 2009 presidential elections until a 
constitution has been drafted174. What function a constitution may fulfil might not conform 
with Western ideals, and may actually create an even more presidentialist system or fulfil no 
real function at all; as noted by Ricardo Soares de Oliveira: “…the fact is real power relations 
take place on an extra-constitutional level”175, again facilitated by the fact that Angola’s 
political elite are insulated from donor pressures, funded significantly by the oil industry. 
Over the last thirty years under dos Santos has demonstrated no real desire to democratise, 
either his state institutions or the MPLA party; he heads the government, is commander-in-
chief of the armed forces, as well as appoints the president, decides who is in government, and 
cannot be removed from power by means of a vote of no confidence176. While this concerns 
the west, the Chinese, by invoking sovereignty, are content with it, and Angola even provides 
a modicum of stability, relative to its Zimbabwean and central African neighbours. 
 
Monday Okoro, a vice-president of oilfield services company Schlumpberger, insists that 
under the thirty year rule of dos Santos Angola affords investors a safe haven; a sentiment 
echoed by French oil company Total who invested $4 billion during 2009, adding further to 
the vested interested in the state177, thereby strengthening the current dispensation’s hand. 
These “spurious democracies” are often touted by the West as the root of Africa’s woes, and 
successful democracies such as South Africa and Ghana are the shining examples. The origins 
of these strong democracies may be explained by Benjamin Disraeli, writing in The 
Vindication of the English Constitution he maintains rule of law is a sine quo non for 
establishing a democracy, that democracy was the fruit of civil order178. His contemporary 
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example was that of the United States, which easily made the transition from colonial 
protectorate to that of an independent constitutional society, whereas their South American 
neighbours did not. The same may be inferred in Africa today; the state that was able to 
establish a stringent set of laws post independence, as well as during an egregious oligarchical 
era was that of South Africa. That Angola suffered under the yoke of an exceptionally 
oppressive Portuguese colonial regime until the mid-1970s and then tumbled into nearly thirty 
years of war, means that no reasonable rule of law was established… the roots of a liberal 
Western democracy. What this has thus far done for Angola, is afford it the aforementioned 
economic stability, but lead it to being labelled “failed yet successful” as a result of its poor 
record on governance and transparency flanking consistent economic growth179, aided to great 
effect in recent times by China’s investments. 
 
ExIm Bank 
 
China may have shifted from an ideologically driven policy to a more pragmatic economic-
based one, but not to the whole exclusion of politics; however, the pragmatic economic aspect 
is certainly dominant, albeit tenuously linked to politics. This will be expanded upon by 
referring to the China Export-Import bank (ExIm) and the methods they undertake in 
financing Chinese ventures in Angola.  
 
An ExIm bank’s function to facilitate credit financing between two states, allowing products 
and services from the participating states to benefit from a single export credit agency (ECA) 
financing package180. ExIm banks, like all foreign policy instruments, are designed to serve 
the country providing the service, by a number of means, inter alia, create employment in the 
financing state, provide a platform for export growth for local industry to the funded state, and 
counter trade subsidies of other governments181. Critically, ExIm banks provide protection 
against the political and commercial risks offered up by international trade. ECAs, under the 
Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), have stipulated 
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guidelines to which they pledge to adhere, referred to as the “Common Approaches”182. The 
common approaches are crucial in preventing a free-rider in the system, sans which a state 
may utilise different criteria in terms of corruption ratings, environmental concerns, and the 
establishment of market-related minimum interest rate183. By this carrot method the West has 
sought to introduce conditionalities with their loans to developing states that all (OECD) 
states would apply, thereby minimising the possibility of defection by another state… China, 
however, is not part of the OECD. 
 
ExIm banks most often utilise concession loans, defined as a “loan provided to poorest 
countries with lower interest rates and longer repayment periods than typical or standard 
market or multilateral loans, i.e. less than market interest rate and extended grace period.”184 
Specifically, the OECD, in terms of official development assistance (ODA), defines a loan as 
concessional only when it entails “flows to developing countries provided by official agencies 
which have a clear development purpose and are at least partially concessional in nature.”185 
These loans come with conditions that are meant to promote the ideals that the lenders wish to 
advance within the states that are being lent to, violating any of the conditions may see an 
unfavourable revision of the repayment terms (given the length of the loans, they are 
periodically subject to revision), withholding of funds or outright cancellation of a loan and 
even legally prohibiting any loans to a state. As with private industry, countries are “rated” 
and the US ExIm, for example, produces a country limitation schedule (CLS), ranking a state 
by public and private sectors186. 
 
China ExIm Bank… 
 
While Taylor may insist that China is not an Orwellian state in complete control of its 
citizenry, one would be hard pressed to find as state that is as intricately involved in its 
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foreign lending process. China ExIm bank provided 92 percent of the recorded Chinese 
infrastructure investment finance commitments to Sub-Saharan Africa for the period 2001-
2007187. This is of great consequence, as the Chinese ExIm bank operates in a fundamentally 
different manner to that of the OECD states’ ExIm banks, and differently from even fellow 
developing state India’s ExIm bank. Though, China ExIm bank, as with other ExIm banks, 
does aim to “implement state policy in industry, foreign trade and economy, finance and 
diplomacy”188 
 
Foster, et. al. carried out an in-depth analysis of the finance of infrastructure in Sub-Saharan 
Africa. The nature of the Chinese ExIm bank meant that direct measurement of Chinese 
infrastructure could not be direct and many of their findings were based on extrapolation of 
available data189. A paucity of information as to the Chinese investment methods also calls 
into question the veracity of Chinese claims, and comparing Chinese infrastructure investment 
with Western ODA is a misnomer. Traditional ODA is usually a North-South cooperative 
effort for development purposes, delivered by means of bilateral or multilateral aid 
agencies190. The ultimate (and explicit) goal of this ODA is poverty reduction, harmonised by 
OECD guidelines meant to untie contracts and develop safeguards; China differs significantly 
in this regard. Post Mao saw ideology being afforded less weighting in terms of foreign 
policy, as well as China’s view of traditional aid. This view changed when end 1982 
beginning touring Chinese Premier Zhao Ziyang outlined China’s emphasis on cooperation 
rather than aid, mostly in order to cover a Chinese reduction in foreign aid191.  
 
…in Angola 
 
Chinese financial flows to Africa mostly take place by one of three methods, namely: grant 
aid, which is mainly aid in kind; zero interest loans, 90 percent of which are considered as 
written off over time; and concessional loans, almost always through the ExIm bank192. This 
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has dramatically increased in Angola post 2002, with the end of the civil war China’s 
engagement swung from military interests to almost solely investment. The result of this is 
best demonstrated by the fact that in 2008 Angola was listed as the number two oil supplier to 
China, which can be greatly attributed to the first $4 billion Chinese loan to Africa193. This 
Chinese venture has been so successful it has come to be referred to as the “Angola Mode” 
and will be referred to in greater depth now. 
 
The Chinese Construction Bank (CCB) and ExIm Bank opened relations with the Angolan 
government in 2002, providing the first funding for infrastructure development; the Angolan 
Ministry of Trade had little input, however, as CCB and ExIm Bank funding was provided 
directly to Chinese firms – what was to become the modus operandi for the Chinese 
financiers. A ‘framework agreement” was signed in late 2003 and on 21 March 2004 the first 
$2 billion financing package for public investment projects was approved by the Chinese 
Ministry of Trade; the loan is payable over twelve to fifteen years at a highly concessional 
interest rate, with a grace period of up to three years194. It is divided into two phases, with $1 
billon assigned to each; the first phase was broken down into health, education, energy and 
water, agriculture, transport, social communication, and public works for a total of 
$1,109,287,188.28195. 
 
The aforementioned Angola Mode is the method by which China is providing these loans to 
states that cannot provide adequate guarantees to back their loan commitments. By this 
method China is able to gain physical security over resources at normally196 discounted rates. 
Little is known about the details but experience suggests that the price of the resource (oil in 
the Angolan case) is not fixed over the period of the loan and that the terms of the loan are 
typically adjusted, for example if the price of oil increases the repayment period decreases.197 
Framework agreements signed with China see very little (if any) transfer of funds to Angola; 
rather infrastructure investment programs see contracts being carried out by Chinese firms, 
while at the same time the petroleum rights are awarded to a Chinese firm. Angola will then 
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instruct China to carry out these infrastructure projects, supported by ExIm Bank credit198, for 
whom 70 percent of the contracts must be awarded to Chinese firms199, 200. Angola then 
proceeds to repay the loan with oil produced by the Chinese company. 
 
This is not to say Angola is not wholly obsequious in this process. The credit facility 
afforded Angola is managed by Angola’s Reconstruction Office, Gabinete de Reconstrução 
Nacional (GRN) which is directly accountable to the Angolan presidency201. The GRN’s 
raison d’être is manage large investment projects and ensure rapid post-war infrastructure 
reconstruction, under the auspices of General Helder Vieira Dias “Kopelipa”, in order to 
provide work for a demobilised military and under the assumption that the other Angolan 
ministries would not have the organizational and technical capacity to manage the large 
inflows of money directed to the GRN; sources approximate that GRN projects are valued at 
$10 billion202. 
 
 
Bane or boon? 
 
Criticism of Chinese intervention in Africa abounds, often referred to as the “new scramble 
for Africa” and even being labelled “neo-colonialists” by then British foreign secretary Jack 
Straw, noting that “what China [is] doing in Africa now was much the same as Britain had 
done 150 years before”203. China’s unwillingness to attach conditions to their massive loans 
and her willingness to deal with pariah states has drawn even greater criticism. Both points of 
view will now be further explored. 
 
 The vagueness of the terms of the contract afforded Angola present, for the West at least, a 
significant problem. For them, this is endemic of nefarious Chinese dealings, not least of all 
with states that are on the West’s verboten list. This is a misnomer, however, as one can also 
gauge the terms of these deals by sheer observation, as carried out by Foster, et. al., who were 
able to reasonably measure the effects of the infrastructure finance provided.  Additionally, 
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China did not deal in Angolan infrastructure finance pre-2002 as the risk was too great, 
thereby demonstrating that whilst the Chinese are less risk averse, they still act rationally and 
therefore predictably. 
 
That Angola does benefit considerably is difficult to dispute. As a pariah state in terms of 
lending credit – she is not afforded any loans exceeding a seven year period by the US ExIm 
bank, for example – Angola has been given a credit supply line that is so crucial in post-war 
construction. China has also provided a significant amount of debt relief to African countries 
of at least US $780 million since 2000, with Angola being a major beneficiary204. This has 
reduced country indebtedness enormously and fiscally freed up Angola thereby allowing 
Angola to (responsibly) assume much needed credit. Nor are the terms as onerous as many 
Westerners offers; as understood Angola repays the loan in kind as follows – the revenue 
from oil sold is placed in an escrow account from which the exact amount due in terms of the 
debt is deducted, the remainder is handed over to the Angolan government205. The interest 
rates for the 2004 $2 billion loan have been estimated to be at an exceptionally low 0.25 
percent with a three year grace period and fifteen year repayment. Thus far one would be hard 
pressed to identify exploitation by the Chinese dispensation. Shortcomings are numerous, 
however. 
 
Most notably, and most often called attention to by Western governments and institutions, is 
the impact China has on transparency and governance, and development, as well as China’s 
perceived lax corporate standards on corruption, worked safety and environment206. China’s 
relatively free flowing funds are bound to give rise to competition for control these massive 
funds, and it has in Angola. In Angola the GRN was established to kick start the following: 
 
• Rehabilitation of the 497.5-kilometer highway from Luanda to Lobito; 
• Rehabilitation of the 1,107-kilometer highway from Malanje to Saurimo, 
• Saurimo to Luena, and Saurimo to Dundo; 
• Phase II of the rehabilitation of the Luanda Railway; 
• Rehabilitation of the 1,547.2-kilometer Benguela Railway and of the 
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• 1,003.1-kilometer Moçâmedes Railway; 
• Drainage and improvement works in the city of Luanda; 
• Construction of 215,500 residential units in 24 different cities across 
• Angola’s 18 provinces; 
• Construction of a new Luanda International Airport at Bom Jesus; 
• Studies and projects for the new city of Luanda.207 
 
The first Chinese loan seemed to trigger a struggle within the Angolan leadership for these 
funds and that senior presidential advisers may have been sidelined after the Chinese became 
concerned at rent seeking. Further, allegations of mismanagement of funds allegations have 
emerged208. In 2007 Angolan security chief General Fernando Garcia Miala, on trial for 
attempted insurrection, threatened to reveal the names of individuals in senior government 
positions who had benefited from the diversion of funds from Chinese lines of credit209. 
Preceding the internal issues in 2007, however, many of these projects came to a halt as the 
China International Fund Ltd. (CIF) had difficulties in raising the funds. This resulted in the 
Angolan Ministry of Finance having to raise $3.5 billion in domestic funding by issuing 
treasury bonds210. This put the Angolan government in the tenuous position of actually 
funding Chinese firms so as to ensure the completion of the projects. 
 
A fact also emphasised with regards to Chinese infrastructure investment is that of “white 
elephants”. This older, cruder style of Chinese investment involves building “prestige 
projects" with little benefit to the people or they are utilised for the wrong purposes. This 
occurred in Ethiopia when housing for flood victims were occupied by the military; China 
took no interest, stating “It was a political task for us and so long as the Ethiopian officials are 
happy, our goal is fulfilled”211. China’s unswerving “respect” for state sovereignty is also 
problematic. As mentioned earlier, China invokes sovereignty with often spurious and 
therefore often unstable states, should a regime change take place or the infrastructure not 
benefit the majority in the long run, China may just come to be viewed as a neo-colonialist in 
hindsight. Contrary to the Chinese requirements are Angola’s rigorous demands for local 
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content that international firms are required to ensure that two-thirds of their workforce is 
Angolan, as well as ensuring that training and local development take place212. 
 
Versus the rest 
 
While China may not be number one in absolute investment terms in Angola, they are 
making significant inroads into traditional former Western colonies. Angola, however, is 
growing tired of stressing that China’s influence is overplayed. Angola is mostly straight 
forward about their cooperation with China, as well as not wanting to depend on any one 
nation, with dos Santos stating at the end of 2008 that “…globalization naturally makes us see 
the need to diversify international relations and to accept the principle of competition, which 
has in a dynamic manner, replaced the petrified concept of zones of influence that used to 
characteri[s]e the world.”213 Upon analysing the trend in investment in Angola, one certainly 
notices an increase in Chinese numbers, but not disproportionately so, given their 
development expansion in the international field on a whole. Whilst the EU, with the 
exception of Portugal, has lost the greatest share from 1977 to 2004, India, South Africa, and 
Brazil have all gained in terms of imports into Angola; a large number of these imports are 
cheaper Chinese substitutes for more expensive Western goods, also attributable to a 
strengthening euro. Deputy Governor of the Angolan National Bank notes that the expanding 
relationship with China should be viewed as a logical reorientation of trading partners rather 
than a “current phenomenon”214. China has taken a sizeable chunk of EU and US Angolan 
exports, mostly represented by the gains made by the Chinese in the oil industry, and even 
though Angola is now the number one African oil supplier to China, the US is still the main 
importer of Angolan oil, although losing significantly to China and even South Africa in 
relative terms215. Chinese foreign direct investment (FDI) to Angola is still small when 
compared to Western FDI, even in the oil sector which is still dominated by Western 
companies such as Chevron, Total, BP, and ExxonMobil; not surprisingly, Portugal still 
dominates industries outside the extractive field216. 
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These figures, however, conceal an underlying fact about Western investment in Africa, 
over and above the conditions that usually come attached. Whilst Chinese loans to Angola 
may realise very little cash value, they do materialise in the form of civil projects, and, most 
notably, in the current term. The US and EU struggle to compete with China when it comes to 
cash flows and, even given the financial wherewithal, it is the commitment that is usually 
lacking; whether being railroaded by civil society in the West or bulwarked in their political 
systems under pressure from lobbies, Western investment often takes an inordinately long 
time to materialise, if ever. Senegalese president Abdoulaye Wade noted that a contract with 
the World Bank takes up to five years to discuss, negotiate, and sign, whereas the Chinese can 
complete the same process within three months217. This is facilitated, in most part, by the 
Chinese system of rule wherein civil society is subordinated, which has also contributed to the 
phenomenal Chinese growth witnessed over the past thirty years. This provides a possible 
exemplar for Angola. 
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Chapter Five 
 
A Suitable Response 
 
 
In determining a suitable Angolan response, one needs first establish whether or not there is a 
true threat posed by China. The China threat thesis is mostly informed by Western discourse 
and compares China’s expansion into Africa to the original late nineteenth century European 
scramble for Africa. This chapter will start out by highlighting the significant differences 
between the original push into Africa and contemporary Sino-African relations. Inferring 
from Singapore to Angola also has its limitations; this will be discussed as well as the 
similarities highlighted. Both the hard power options, in the form of democracy and internal 
governance, and soft power options, in the form of regionalism and trade, will be introduced 
 
China threat? 
 
One needs first to consider the nature of the “China threat”. It has been referred to as the 
second wave of colonialism, following on from “The Scramble for Africa”, explained to great 
effect by Thomas Pakenham. Then, as now, there were concerns not only with old world 
colonisers, but also China; Chinese labourers were seen as a threat by indigenous Africans to 
their wage rates and possibly their land as well – Europeans were as concerned that the 
Chinese would “slip out of their compounds, subvert the morality of the unspoilt ‘natives’, 
steal European jobs and businesses, and [turn] Johannesburg [into] ‘practically a Chinese 
town’ ”218. History, however, pays little notice to the Chinese threat of just over one hundred 
years ago, rightly so in light of the decades that followed that fateful Berlin Conference of 
1884219. The exploitation that characterised the era that persisted until the early 1960s, and 
1975 in Angola’s case, is being compared by some to the contemporary Chinese breach of 
African markets. As earlier noted, this is a mode of thought rife amongst international 
theorists of a realist bent, such as Mearsheimer, who view China’s rise as a competition to the 
US and the increase of Sino-African relations as a loss to them; NGO’s and other states insist 
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that China is merely exploiting a weakened and divided continent. Most African states, 
however, see it in a different light. 
 
Comparing modern day Africa to that of late nineteenth century Africa has severe 
limitations. With the exception of long standing colonies such as South Africa, most of Africa 
was still considered a “dark continent” and thus not privy to the Weberian state, and the 
protections afforded such states as set out by the Treat of Westphalia. Today all fifty three 
African states are represented at the United Nations and, thus, afforded the rights (and duties) 
of a recognised state, as spurious as some of them may be – it is by these means, as sovereign 
states, that the Chinese dispensation engages many African states. One may question the 
efficient and fair allocation of resources in these “spurious states” and, accordingly, impose 
limitations on trade with them, but they are sovereign states nonetheless, albeit perhaps 
outside of the Western democratic ideal; the efficacy and validity of democracy will be 
addressed further on. Therefore, whilst a “China threat” hypothesis may faintly plausible, 
there are many caveats, inter alia, China is not preoccupied with Africa – whilst Africa may 
be a significant supply of resources, it is ultimately only three percent of total annual Chinese 
trade; following on from point one is China’s vulnerable international base, the 
interdependence that China shares mostly with the US – the long-terms benefits of any 
African trade are significantly outweighed by the extremely favourable trade with the US; 
locally, Chinese development is very uneven and the “domestic base for Chinese prosperity is 
in fact politically volatile” – while not to a democratic states extent, this limits the Chinese 
investment and it is, therefore, not the wanton throwing of money at despotic states, as so 
often portrayed; the previous point leads onto the proposal that the “Shanghai School” may 
supersede the “Washington Consensus”, with even the Indians emulating the former rather 
than the latter – this does lock the investing state, be it China or India, into the African states 
in the long-term however, and a key omission in the “Shanghai” model is how to ensure 
Africa is stable during this period220, contrary to China’s current sovereignty card. Any 
options considered further in this chapter will be cognisant of the “China threat”, but will also 
be pragmatic in this regard while considering the influence of the West. 
 
 
 
                                                 
220 Chan, S. “Ten Caveats and One Sunrise in Our Contemplation of China and Africa”, in Snow, P. in Alden, 
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Too great a divide? 
 
Inferring a solution from Singapore to Angola presents a number of issues, namely: a cultural 
divide, historical disparities, and geographical differences; these have also all been of 
importance when comparing why Africa has failed to develop whereas Southeast Asia has 
boomed in the same period. 
 
Generalising from an Eastern culture to Africa impacts on validity issues insofar that 
Singapore, being predominantly Chinese, is informed by more than two millennia of 
Confucianism as a result of a united Chinese kingdom. Africa, on the other hand, is a 
continent of disparate cultures, each developing at different rates and down different paths. 
Singapore is not a democratic institution, as promoted so vociferously by the West in Africa. 
African states, theoretically, are bound by short election terms and therefore are not able to 
implement the long term strategies as applied by Singapore.  
 
Geographically, Singapore may be Angola’s polar opposite, lacking natural resources, a 
large populace, and only covering 648 square kilometres, but the responses to the 
vulnerability that arises from these characteristics may be applied to Angola nonetheless. 
Singapore learnt to offset her geographical shortcomings by developing a strong political 
system, applied domestically and regionally; Angola could exploit her resources to even 
greater effect were she able to emulate such a system, with minor adjustments to suit her 
needs. 
 
Looking to the East as a “developmental model” has mostly relied on Western 
interpretations of secondary English language sources, and is thus limited. Deborah 
Brautigam contends, however, that “[China] has a deep history and as broad a range of 
experience as any experience established in the West”221. Shared colonial histories are an 
important common point with Singapore, as are the vulnerabilities that Angola faces today, 
relative to her more power southern neighbour. Cultural dissimilarities are negated somewhat 
by the trend of globalisation, as the system promotes less the dissimilarities and builds rather 
on shared opportunities; given that Singapore’s ascension occurred within this globalised 
network and actually benefited from it is an indication that cultural differences may be 
                                                 
221 Brautigam, D. as cited in Large, D. “Beyond the Dragon in the Bush: The Study of China-Africa Relations”. 
Africa Affairs, Vol. 107, No. 426, p. 53 
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negligible. Similarities such as the vulnerability of the state may be exploited, as well as 
development issues; whilst Angola may be endowed with resources, its capacity to 
independently exploit these resources is limited, thus placing it in a similar position to 
Singapore in her pre-development era. Replicating a Singapore rule of law system 
underpinned by a sense of vulnerability, as well as recognising the importance of regional 
integration are models that supersede cultural discrepancies. 
 
The resource curse may also be invoked here and its impact on Angolan versus Singaporean 
government policy and objectives. The Angolan government, with the option of being a 
rentier state, is relatively insulated from pressures, domestic, regional, and international. 
Singapore, being even water scarce, is in a far more precarious position, and thus will have 
different economic ambitions and, by inference, government policies to implement as much. 
Singapore evolved to become one of the “Asian Tigers” and is therefore significantly 
influential in the region. Angola, whilst not insignificant in Southern Africa, still plays a 
distance third fiddle to South Africa and Botswana in practically all financial indicators. This 
is not to say Angola is powerless, especially in light of South Africa’s declining relative 
power in the region222. Angola is resource endowed, has an unfettered coastline, and has 
developed significant economic partnerships with both the West and China as a result of the 
former. 
 
Considering options 
 
As with Singapore, Angola needs to apply techniques that lean toward both the hard and soft 
ends of the power continuum, the former at home, invoking sovereignty, and the latter beyond 
Angola’s borders, to counter regional state weakness. 
 
Hard power - governance 
 
The West vociferously insists that good governance and development will follow democracy, 
and accordingly attaches conditions to most loans and assistance; the alternative to a Western 
                                                 
222 See Alence, R. “SACU and the Political Economy of Regionalism: Towards Deeper and Broader 
Integration?” South African Institute of International Affairs Trade Policy Briefing, No. 12, June2006, wherein 
a the impact of 2002 agreement was analysed using a game theoretic analysis, noting how South Africa’s strong 
arm of unilateralism was on the decline 
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democracy will be explored here and its viability, as well as Singapore’s form of autocratic 
rule with regards to Angola will be expanded upon,.   
 
The development of the Weberian African state was not one forged under normal 
circumstances as in Europe, where states faced existential threats and formed rule of law 
regimes accordingly; in Africa, South Africa under the apartheid regime believed it faced 
such a threat and, combined with the lengthiest colonial rule, developed and maintained a 
strict rule of law system, à-la Singapore. Africa’s state system was mostly an imposed one, 
one which was exposed to the proxy wars of the Cold War period, and therefore never came 
to mature into the examples of their progenitors; this has led to a subversion of democracy of 
sorts in Africa, thereby severely limiting its efficacy. The evolution of many African 
democracies has seen the separation of the governing party from the leaders and 
representatives, the glorification of political power, and the rise of the system of patronage223. 
It is not merely patronage and separation of the leadership from the social base that 
characterises and sustains African powers, it is also sustained by means of contact with the 
Western world, from whom the bureaucratic structures are imported and who provide much of 
the financial resources needed to maintain the organisation224. The failure of this system was 
mostly attributed to the Cold War, where dictators like Mobutu Sese Seku retained power by 
means of appealing to their respective patrons, namely the United States or the Soviet Union; 
Fukuyama’s “End of History” theoretically saw the end of this support of these faux 
governments in favour of supporting democracies. That the West chose to infer from its 
democratic successes has proven to be erroneous. 
 
In the twenty years since the Berlin Wall fell democracy has had no true competition on the 
African continent and therefore had all the space in which to flourish; additionally, the 
relative isolation after Tiananmen Square cast a shadow on the authoritarian systems, such as 
China’s system. Angola was on a particularly hard receiving end, only gaining independence 
from Angola in 1975 but then being plunged into consecutive wars until 2002, the last civil 
war as a result of a disputed democratic election in 1992. That the 2008 election results were 
again contentious and the 2009 presidential elections have been continuously postponed 
                                                 
223 Clapham, C. “The African State”, in Rimmer, D. Africa Thirty Years On, Royal African Society in 
association with James Currey and Heinemann, London, 1991, p. 92 
224 Ibid, p. 97 
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indicates that perhaps Angola requires a stepping stone on the path to democracy, particularly 
one that which will lead to the establishment of a rule of law system. 
 
Rule of law would bring confidence in the state far quicker than would democracy; the latter 
does not guarantee it at all, as demonstrated by Angola’s credit record with international 
lenders. Rule of law would also see a reduction in the system of patronage; whilst democracy 
(theoretically) increases accountability, an ambivalence of accountability has emerged in 
underdeveloped states – these regimes of accountability were considered to be external 
creations, thereby creating an awareness of Western government as an alien and imposed 
institution225. Rule of law will also counter the ambivalence of power; post-colonial Africa 
saw the rise of many “artificial” states, so long as the state’s own hierarchy and social groups 
continue to benefit from it, challenging its legitimacy will be difficult, and African rulers have 
generally failed to recognise the fragility of the base upon which their power rested226.  
 
In order to adopt a consultative rule of law regime, Pan notes a six-pillar structure that needs 
to be instituted: 
 
1. The establishment of a neutral civil service system. This would be critical in 
combating the rampant corruption in Angola today. 
2. An autonomous judicial system, a meritocratic system ensuring the civil system is 
checked and balanced’ and as authority of judicial review – serving as the upcoming 
constitution’s final “gatekeeper”. 
3. Extensive social consultations. The MPLA as the ruling party would be the basis of 
this consultation system that would balance and check the legal procedures of law 
making, and ensuring civil service is transparent. 
4. An independent anti-corruption system. Neutrality, history has proven, is not as 
much of a danger to Angola so much as corruption, this institution would be another 
check on the civil service. 
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5. The independent auditing system. Given that public office is most often accused 
with abusing government financial incomes, this system would be critical in 
preventing that abuse. 
6. The freedoms of speech, press, assembly, and association. These do not constitute 
any government institutions per se, but are a standard and principle and standard by 
which government must abide, and are an indispensable part of any modern and 
civilised society, and especially for a rule of law regime.227 
 
As per Singapore, Angola needs to incorporate rather than reject its colonial heritage; 
instituting new structures would be an act of redundancy. These structures afford it an 
advantage when dealing with traditional partners such as Portugal and former Portuguese 
colonies such as Brazil. Whilst Angola was not assigned the role of entrept as Singapore 
was by Britain, that very little technological knowledge was imparted to either state puts 
Angola in a similar position; this is as a result of the colonial legacy wherein subjugate states 
mostly supplied materials and were afforded development only to meet those ends, as 
Singapore’s primary role was that of entrep t, she was assigned greater administrative 
development, Angola was afforded very little of this development under the Portuguese, 
however. This has not stopped the Angolan dispensation from trying to develop what was 
there after independence in 1975 and especially post-2002. That this is mostly at the behest of 
international financial institutions is likely, however it does not mean Angola does not need 
some form of a constitution; rule of law systems are also guided by a constitution, merely one 
that does not enshrine democracy in its fundamental tenets. 
 
From a hard power/military perspective, Angola would like to play a more constructive role 
in the region but is pragmatic and afraid of over-stretch. The country still faces difficulties in 
implementing the ambitious disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration program from the 
civil war era, a secessionist Cabinda province, as well transnational crime and refugee 
movements across the DRC border228. Whilst the Chinese government has a history of 
supporting Angola, they supported the FNLA (as did the US), while the USSR and Cuba 
supported ultimate victors, the MPLA. What is notable, is that Angola’s military relationship 
                                                 
227 Pan, W. (2003a) Op Cit, p. 34 
228 Mai, V.A. & Wisner, F.G. Toward and Angola Strategy: Prioritizing US-Angola Relations. Retrieved 15 
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with the US is limited, but exists nonetheless. The US, seeking a stable Gulf of Guinea, funds 
the International Military Education and Training program, providing English-language 
training to the FAA and professional training to law enforcement officers; additionally, the 
US Department of State’s Office of Weapons Removal and Abatement is supporting 
continued de-mining efforts by NGOs and the Angolan government to the tune of $6 million 
until 2013229. These amounts may be relatively insignificant, but offer the Angolan 
dispensation a base upon which to build further ties that do not bind it to any single country. 
Significantly, Chinese purchases from Angola are not in the same mode as Sudanese-Chinese 
purchases, where nearly 80 percent of Sudan’s $500 million in annual oil revenues are used to 
purchase (mostly) Chinese weapons and even Chinese built three weapons factories near 
Khartoum with the assistance of the Chinese230. Currently, China’s military dealings with 
Angola are typical of its modus operandi, namely that of selling small weapons, in addition to 
eight Chinese built Su-27 SK fighter jets231, but China’s assistance to the MPLA run 
administration is limited when compared to other African states, possibly as a hangover from 
China’s support of the FNLA. This does not imply that China is not pragmatic, however, and 
given the opportunity she would most likely expand military ties with Angola, as 
demonstrated by her White Paper released in 2006, “promis[ing] to intensify arms sales and 
military training in Africa, expand intelligence sharing, and deepen cooperation between 
Chinese and African law enforcement agencies.”232 Angola would do well to be wary of 
China in the short term, and rather engage her in local fora. 
 
Soft power – regionalism 
 
Singapore utilised regionalism to great effect, without it impinging on its sovereignty, it 
actually employs regionalism for both security and economic purposes; the island’s regional 
vulnerability informs this to a great degree. Unlike Singapore, Angola does not stand at any 
significant regional crossroads, geographically or culturally, she is however still a major 
trading partner with the West as well as increasing trade with China at a significant rate – this 
                                                 
229 Ibid, p. 31 
230 Brookes, P. & Shin, J.H. “China's Influence in Africa: Implications for the United States”. Retrieved 17 
January 2010 from http://www.heritage.org/Research/AsiaandthePacific/bg1916.cfm 
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affords Angola the opportunity to cement ties with her current partners whilst stepping up 
Sino trade. 
 
 
Given Angola’s relative weakness vis-à-vis her main trading partners as well as compared to 
the dominant force in the region, South Africa, she needs to adopt a hedging strategy. That 
Angola is China’s biggest African oil supplier is to be noted, however, China’s future is likely 
to be that of sharing power with the US, even in the long-term, and Angola should be aware 
of this and plan accordingly. For Angola, the continuing China ExIm bank relationship is the 
most beneficial for the time being, IMF and World Bank loans are too onerous when 
compared to the Chinese loans. The conditions that come with the Chinese loans need to be 
re-negotiated, however. Whilst conforming to China’s seventy percent requirement, they are 
contrary to Angolan policy, but given China’s recovery from the global economic crisis, her 
demand for resources will continue unabated for the foreseeable future, affording Angola 
greater leverage, especially seeing as the West still dominate Angolan trade and the Chinese 
will need “woo” Angola. This does depend, however, on regional cooperation, as Angola’s 
competitors may undercut her à-la prisoner’s dilemma and it is therefore in Angola’s best 
interest to develop significant regional relations. 
 
Regional integration for Angola would have to take into account South Africa, the regional 
hegemon. The disadvantage of entering a forum dominated by South Africa is best 
demonstrated by the South African Customs Union (SACU); even after the 2002 re-
negotiation of the SACU agreement, we still find South Africa dominating the union as a 
result of her advanced rate of industrialisation and the dependence of the other member states 
on her233. South Africa would periodically increase the common revenue pool to pre-empt 
serious consideration withdrawal by other the states234, thus contributing to the longevity of 
the SACU. In promoting pan-regionalism, SACU goes down a similar path that NEPAD and 
the APRM go down, that of impinging on sovereign affairs. NEPAD’s explicit raison d’être 
is to “correct Africa’s multiple political, economic, and structural inadequacies”235. To these 
ends, NEPAD promotes democracy, observing a lack thereof is the root cause of poor 
economic performance and political governance. Democracies, NEPAD insists, reduce the 
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possibility of conflict and promote conditions necessary for growth236. This is of course 
assuming that a democracy is working efficiently, and not the “spurious” democracy that 
characterises some African states. These conditions, as applied by NEPAD and the APRM, 
would be contrary to the implementation of any rule of law system by Angola, and therefore 
complying with the criteria would see the promotion of an already inefficient democratic 
system. SACU does, however, afford Angola a common external tariff under the 1999 Trade, 
Development and Co-operation Agreement (TDCA) between South Africa and the European 
Union237, thereby integrating Angola further into the world economy and reducing her 
reliance on any single partner, whether it is China or the West.  
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Conclusion 
 
 
China’s expansion into Africa, whether a threat or not, is a reality that both the African 
continent and the West have to deal with; ascertaining whether or not it is a threat and the 
nature of the expansion, however, will afford Angola a greater position of authority. African 
attraction to China as of late has been facilitated by soft power; however, soft power in its 
strictest definition precludes carrots and, according to Nye, is generally beyond the control of 
the state238. As noted however, soft and hard power are not mutually exclusive polar 
opposites, rather they exist on a continuum, and in fact inform each other. Accepting this, one 
needs assess what China hopes to benefit from her soft power manoeuvres in Africa. 
 
China’s pragmatism under soft power is clearly informed by the limited nature thereof in its 
purest form. Soft power is said to be beyond the control of the state and achieves diffuse 
rather than specific goals, and profoundly influenced by civil society – a branch that is limited 
at best in China. Africa’s disparate nature also limits the efficacy of a Chinese version of soft 
power, fundamental intra-African differences as well as Sino-African differences. It is 
therefore difficult to claim that pure soft power informs Chinese foreign policy, rather one 
needs to contextualise Chinese foreign policy – that is to say China is far more likely to lean 
toward the soft power of the spectrum when dealing with a less threatening state that she has 
traditional ties with, as with many African states; however, as demonstrated by the recent 
Copenhagen Climate summit, China leans toward the hard power pole when confronted by 
her natural international competitors and when she believes her national interests are under 
threat239.  
 
China uses this blend of soft and hard power to great effect; she has traditional hard power 
links from her more ideologically oriented era as well as providing an alternative and very 
successful developmental model. This model, coupled with China’s funding has significantly 
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239 See Rennie, D. “Eurpoe and an inscrutable China”. Retrieved 3 February 2010 from 
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bubble that China has projected. 
64 
 
increased her soft power in Africa. That China explicitly seeking mutually beneficial 
cooperation amongst developed nations in order to facilitate common prosperity puts her head 
and shoulders above the West. This is not to say that China’s soft power is all conquering, 
limits as a result of cultural disparities and a difference in political regimes tends to limit the 
efficacy of soft power, according to Ferguson. The former is significant when referring to 
Africa and China, the latter less so; the gap between China and many African states’ political 
dispensations is not as great as the gap between the West and some African states, thereby 
facilitating soft power further. 
 
China’s traditional dealings with Africa, under the ideological guise, were primarily of a 
hardened realist bent; Taiwan recognition and ideology on the whole is no longer an issue and 
access to resources in Africa is better facilitated by the use of a soft power oriented. However, 
in light of the recent global economic crisis and the greater clout afforded to the Chinese 
dispensation, they have demonstrated a significantly more hardened position in the 
international arena240. Chinese increase in influence in Africa needs also be considered; China 
has less reason to rely on soft power as she “has her foot in the door” already, so to speak – 
Angola demonstrates this ably. China has significant long term financial contracts in Angola, 
these contracts bind the Angolan government to an almost onerous degree – extracting the 
Angolan government from these contracts would be impossible. China is cognisant of this 
and, in light of her recent bellicosity on the world stage; she may easily revert to a more 
hardened stance. In the interim China’s use of soft power, the diluted version that China 
proffers, is utilised to great effect. 
 
Angola’s attraction for the PRC is primarily that of resources as well as Angola’s vote at the 
UN General Assembly. This is reductionist to some extent; China also seeks to promote her 
version of multilateralism, especially countering the Hobbesian oriented, Bush driven doctrine 
of a post-9/11 United States, which saw American soft power plummet world-wide. China 
also seeks to practice what she preaches – demonstrating that she is prepared to deal with 
sovereign states without interfering in their internal affairs and, accordingly, China expects to 
be treated the same. What is contentious, however, is the manner in which China invokes 
sovereignty. Again, here we find West vociferously criticising China, whilst promoting its 
                                                 
240 See the recent row over proposed US arms sales to Taiwan – which would ordinarily elicit protest from 
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political ideals in Africa, even attaching conditions to significant loans. That China is dealing 
with Angola as an internationally recognised sovereign state, undercuts the argument in this 
case study from the international perspective for the PRC. 
 
The IFIs, transnational groups and the US are particularly vocal about China’s modus 
operandi, especially when China invokes the sovereignty card. Western concerns revolve 
primarily around China’s impact on transparency on the African continent, how Chinese 
funding undercuts efforts to improve accountability and establish democratic institutions. Of 
course, from a less altruistic perspective, the West is also seeing access to traditional former 
colonial strongholds decrease and access to resources within these regions. The drop in the 
world price of oil during the Great Recession saw Angola’s importance diminished somewhat, 
seeing as the economic climes are on the increase – especially China’s – the impact of 
resources on foreign policy will increase accordingly. Traditionally Africa, and Angola in 
particular, has proven to be a sparring ground for external powers, however, post-Cold War 
ideologies were afforded less weight and democracy came to the fore.  
 
For Angola, the democratic path has proven to be a thorny one. The modicum of stability 
afforded by the dos Santos regime, as illegitimate as the 2009 elections looked, has proven to 
be a boon for Angola, more so than any potential democracy, especially given the region’s 
success with democracy. That Angola suffers from transparency and patronage issues, as 
demonstrated by the wrangling in the GRN, indicates that rule of law is lacking. Democracy 
alone will not provide Angola with the credit rankings and political transparency that it 
requires; effective implementation of rule of law will make far greater strides in terms of 
transparency and development, as demonstrated by the Singaporean system. The leverage of 
Western institutions has been offset by China’s financial assistance; Angola is therefore under 
less democratic reform pressure. That Angola has significant oil reserves puts her in a greater 
position of strength, allowing her to court both China and the West; here Angola needs to 
hedge, as Singapore has done. While Angola will still encounter pressure to reform 
politically, and should improve governance and transparency issues, the onus is upon the 
Angolan dispensation and should not necessarily have to follow Western exemplars that are 
not necessarily suited to the historical or current Angolan state of affairs. 
 
Singapore presents a viable alternative model for both withstanding Chinese and Western 
influences as well as introducing a political alternative to Western democracy, albeit with 
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generalisation issues. That Singapore shares a colonial past with Africa strengthens any 
inference from the city-state, as well as Singapore’s perceived sense of vulnerability – a 
sentiment shared by African since the era of independence. By separating high and low 
politics Singapore engages on an economic level with China and hedges against the PRC by 
establishing security ties with, inter alia, the US. The ascent of the China, not only regionally, 
but also internationally may impact on this hedging arrangement, this is offset to a degree by 
hedging. Similarly, Angola may benefit from implementing an effective hedging strategy – 
currently China may not be Angola’s biggest trading partner, however, relative Chinese 
growth and the nature thereof (the size and penetration of the loans as well as Angola being 
obliged to cover any Chinese faux pas241) means that Angola is likely to become significantly 
more dependent on the PRC. 
 
Over and above any internal resolutions, Angola needs to be cognisant of her neighbours 
and regional integration will impact her. Singapore too was reluctant to take an active role in 
ASEAN, viewing it in the 1970s as a weak instrument and a possible launching pad for 
Indonesian hegemony; similarly Angola is in the position of interacting within a NEPAD 
structure under possible South African hegemony, not to mention the limited efficacy of 
NEPAD thus far. What Singapore learnt, however, was that even seemingly insignificant 
states could wield disproportionately large power relative to their size by being willing to 
adopt a larger share of diplomatic burden – this benefited Singapore insofar that tensions were 
relieved by improving the overall regional climate, rather than through direct attention to 
problem-solving. This would benefit Angola significantly; she borders the Democratic 
Republic of Congo, who happens to geographically separate them from the Angolan enclave 
of Cabinda – greater DRC stability and cooperation could assist in the resolution of the 
Cabinda separatist issue, thereby increasing security in Angola. Democratic reforms as 
prescribed by NEPAD have thus far proved testing for the Angolan regime. However, should 
Angola be able to successfully implement the aforementioned political reforms by means of 
rule of law, she would be able to comply to the most important of NEPAD’s requirements, 
possibly besting her neighbours. Regionalism will also offer Angola protection, reducing her 
reliance on any single state. As the recent economic crisis has demonstrated, the Western 
market is not infallible, and nor should it be assumed the Chinese market is fail-safe.  
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This paper recognises the weakness of inferring from an Eastern society such as Singapore; 
however, given the nature of globalisation and the relatively limited understanding of native 
Eastern language texts, the issue of validity lessens. It does not propose that Angola do an 
about turn on current policies – much Western discourse focuses on Chinese exploitation of 
the former Portuguese colony, a claim which is clearly rubbing the Angolan dispensation up 
the wrong way. Rather, this paper proposes that Angola needs to hedge against possible future 
over reliance on China, especially in light of the latter’s meteoric rise and surprising resilience 
throughout the great recession. Whilst this may be a motive to increase ties with the 
(potential) next hegemon, it will also render Angola vulnerable to the whims and wills of a 
single nation. Additionally, the concept of regionalism has been proposed in light of the 
benefits it would afford Angola, not least of which is stability – something African states and 
African regional organisations long for dearly.  
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